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Abstract
The paper studies the Krugman’s CP model in the weakly explored case of asymmetric regions in
two settings: international trade and agglomeration processes. First setting implies that the industrial
labor is immobile, while second one consider mobile industrial labor and long-run equilibria. An-
alytical study of both settings requires application of advanced mathematical analysis, e.g. implicit
function theory. For international trade we find how equilibrium prices, production, consumption,
wages and welfare for all population groups respond to shifts in all exogenous parameters: character-
istics of utility function, transportation costs and degree of asymmetry in initial labor endowment. As
for agglomeration process, it was found that the asymmetry in the population distribution simplifies
pattern of agglomeration, making the direction of migration more definite, so the well-known ambi-
guity of final destination may disappear under sufficiently large extent of asymmetry. From political
point of view, it means that under some conditions, openness of international trade may be harmful to
immobile population of the smaller country.
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1 Introduction
In the course of many years a concept of Perfect Competitive Market was a lodestar for liberal economics. Related
widely accepted model of perfect competitive market — Arrow–Debreu model — (see Debreu 1959, p. 30) distin-
guishes goods at various locations as different goods. However, it is insufficient to explain features of international
trade and agglomeration. As pointed out by Mundell (1957), if every activity could be carried out on an arbitrarily
small scale in every possible place, without any loss of efficiency, there would be no transportation. This idea was
formally supported by Starrett’s (1978) impossibility theorem. The breakthrough in modifying the main model of
the market to the needs of spatial economics, was made by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) who implemented the Cham-
berlainian idea of inter-firm increasing returns and market power. Their monopolistic-competition model became
a cornerstone of spatial economics, and the seminal step in this direction was implemented by Krugman’s papers
(1980), (1991). These papers initiated the New Economic Geography, developing rapidly and addressing many
interesting questions including agglomeration (see Baldwin et al., 2003; Combes et al., 2008).
This paper belongs to this field. Namely, we study Krugman’s (1991) Core-Periphery model (hereafter CP),
that considers a two-region economy of the Dixit–Stiglitz type and two types of labor: industrial and agricultural
(one can interpret these as skilled and unskilled labor, or any other two industry-specific factors). It is assumed
that the industrial workers are mobile between the regions while the agricultural are not. Wherever a worker
lives, he/she combines residence, consumption and work at the same place. Krugman (1991) has found the full-
agglomeration effect. Namely, under sufficiently small transportation cost, whole industry and industrial labor
should concentrate in one country. Moreover, when initially the countries were identical, which of them becomes
the core and which the periphery, is ambiguous. This means history-dependence of development. Subsequently,
many papers showed simulations of such effects and Fujita et al. (1999) provided a synthesis of the economic
geography based on the Dixit–Stiglitz–Krugman approach. However, main analytical results for CP model were
obtained later, being summarized mainly in Baldwin et al. (2003) (which contains also a wide range of appli-
cations), also in Fujita and Thisse (2002), and Combes et al. (2008). The existence of long-run equilibria, their
number and stability were found, the existence of switching point between dispersed and agglomerated types of
equilibria (see next section for details). With few exceptions mentioned later on, all papers consider symmetric
regions that means total identity of all exogenous parameters. This assumption of symmetry aimed to answer an
important question or intellectual challenge. In contrast to traditional economic geography that derived differences
in development from differences in exogeneous physical circumstances of countries, the new geography distin-
guishes between effects of first nature (exogenous heterogeneity) and second nature, which is the result of human
actions (see Cronon, 1991). The achievement of symmetric model was to explain the endogeneous heterogeneity
emerging from homogeneous first nature. The next step in theory would be to explain how initial exogeneous
heterogeneity interferes with economic forces generating endogeneous heterogeneity.
Agglomeration and dispersion forces: known results
Three driving forces of agglomeration or dispersion in CP model are traditionally discussed. The first is the ‘market
access effect’ that describes the tendency of monopolistic firms to locate their production in the big market but
export to small markets. The second is the ‘cost of living effect’ that concerns the impact of firms’ location on the
local cost of living. Goods tend to be cheaper in the region with numerous industrial firms since consumers in this
region will import a narrower range of products and thus avoid part of the trade costs. These two centripetal forces
are countervailed by the centrifugal ‘market crowding effect’, which reflects the fact that imperfectly competitive
firms have a tendency to reside in regions with relatively few competitors. The first two effects encourage spatial
concentration while the third one discourages it.
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What determines the relative strength of these three forces? The strength of the dispersion force diminishes as
trade gets freer. For example, if trade is almost completely free, competition from foreign firms is approximately
as important as competition from locally based firms. Then shifting firms from south to north will have very little
impact on firm’s revenues and thus on the wages they can pay to industrial workers and ‘cost of living effect’
becomes negligible. Other two effects also become weaker, but generally we shall see that agglomeration prevails.
At the other extreme, near-prohibitive levels of trade cost mean that a change in the number of locally based firms
has a very large impact on competition for customers and thus a very big effect on wages and dispersion prevails.
The strength of agglomeration forces increases continuously as trade gets freer. It means that at some level (‘break
point’) of trade costs the agglomeration forces overpower the dispersion force and self-reinforcing migration ends
up shifting all industry to one region.
The existence of the break point underpins what is perhaps the most striking feature of the CP model — a
symmetric reduction in trade costs between initially symmetric regions eventually produces asymmetric regions.
This mechanism becomes self-reinforcing since as firms move, for example, northwards, the number of industrial
jobs in the south shrinks and the number in the north expands, so the production shifting tends to encourage
further expenditure shifting. The key point here is that if there were no change in industrial wages, the increase in
northern industrial production would have to be more than proportional to the original expenditure shift in order
to re-establish zero profits. (This, of course, is just the famous ‘home market effect’ of Krugman, 1980). Since the
shifting in industrial jobs is more than proportional (holding wages constant), we see that production shift tends to
encourage further migration to the north.
In the course of many years the conclusions of this theory were supported by the numerical simulations only.
For this moment quite complete analytic study was carried out only for symmetric CP models. In this case the
general picture describing stability of long-run equilibria is the following “tomahawk diagram”, see Figure 1, left-
hand side. Here the measure of trade freeness ϕ is, in some extent, inverse value to transportation costs, the bold
lines contain all stable long-run equilibria, dashed “fork” is a set of all unstable equilibria. Along with “break
point” ϕB mentioned above, the diagram contains so-called “sustain point” ϕS — the minimum level of freeness
making total agglomeration equilibria stable. Robert-Nicoud (2005) provides the first analytic proof of the CP
model’s main features, namely that the break point comes before the sustain point (in terms of freeness ϕ) and that
it has at most three locally stable equilibria for any given level of openness. Mossay (2006) proved an existence
and uniqueness of short-run equilibrium in symmetric CP model for all admissible values of parameters.
Figure 1: Tomahawk and “broken” tomahawk, taken from Baldwin et al. (2003). Here SH and Sn denote industrial
labor share.
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Studying of symmetric CP models allows to obtain very important conclusion: the resulting asymmetry (i.e.
agglomeration) is a well-formed result even under condition of initial symmetry. In other words, agglomeration
process may be interpreted in frameworks of “second nature”, i.e. as result of patterns human activity. However, a
theorist can be interested: Are the trade and agglomeration pictures obtained robust against asymmetry or specific
to symmetry?
To answer the appeal of the empirics, some numerical simulations show that certain qualitative conclusions can
not survive in asymmetric case, e.g. relative positions of break points ϕB and sustain points ϕS (see for example,
Appendix C.1 to Chapter 2 of Baldwin et al. (2003), so called “broken tomahawk” on Figure 1, right-hand side).
Moreover, Berliant and Kung (2009) show that symmetric case is singular in some sense.
Generally asymmetry remains weakly studied. The reason for lack of comprehensive analytic study of asym-
metric CP model is substantial complexity of appearing problems, addressed in Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 53)
pessimistically:
“Unfortunately, the intense intractability of the CP model means that numerical simulation of the
model for specific values .... is the only way forward.”
Our contribution
The present paper aims to overcome this seeming “intractability” and give a complete study of Krugman’s CP
model with and without initial heterogeneity, achieving the complete comparative statics of equilibria with respect
to main exogenous parameters.
Note that there are two partial cases when result of struggle between agglomeration and dispersion forces
is obvious. On perfectly competitive market dispersion forces prevail. Starrett’s impossibility theorem is one
of impressive evidences of this idea. On the other hand, purely monopolistic competitive market is domain of
agglomeration forces. More exactly, excluding of perfectly competitive agricultural sector from this model tends
to existing of agglomerated equilibria only, i.e. resulting force for all market forces listed above in the case
of monopolistic competition is agglomeration force. Thus Krugman’s CP model may be considered as mixed
economy model joining features of both perfectly competitive and monopolistic competitive markets. As a natural
measure of relative weight of monopolistic-competitive sector an expenditure share of industral varieties may be
taken. Moreover, intensity of agglomeration effects depends on elasticity of substitution, because its inverse is
interpreted traditionally as “love for variety”. Note that this point of view is not brand new. For example, in
Combes et al. (2008), pp.151-152, we read “Product differentiation plays a key role in the model... In other
words, when varieties are homogeneous, dispersion is the only stable equilibrium. Conversely, when varieties are
more differentiated, the likelihood of agglomeration is higher because the competition effect is weakened” and
“Regarding the share of the manufactured good, it is readily verified that the values of τS and τB increase with
µ , and so does the probability that agglomeration occurs. This is because a larger share of the manufacturing
sector, on which the snowball effect is built, makes the agglomeration force stronger.” Nevertheless, this idea was
not supported by intensive analytical studies and all conclusions concern symmetric case only. In our studies,
prevailing or countervailing of agglomeration and dispersion forces is considered in terms of relative weights of
perfectly competitive and monopolistic competitive sectors, which is measured mainly by expenditure shares.
We start in section 3 with analyzing the short-run equilibria. These describe international trade without any
migration. Our theorem of equlibrium existence generalizes that of Mossay (2006) by allowing for heterogeneity
and simplifies the proof. Our technical achievement enabling this and other results is essential simplification of
equilibrium conditions into one equation with relative wage as a variable. Based on this technique, we analyze
comparative statics of each variable of interest with respect to two parameters: share of agricultural labor θ and
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share of industrial labor λ in home country. First we study relative industrial wage which is the fraction of
industrial wage in home country to foreign wage. Propositions 1 and 3 show that:
(1) relative wage increases monotonically with respect to home share of agricultural population;
(2) under sufficiently small transportation cost (very free trade) relative wage increases monotonically with respect
to share of industrial labor;
(3) under sufficiently big transportation cost relative wage decreases with respect to industrial labor share.
Further we study industrial price indices in both countries and relative price index, which is home industrial
price index divided by foreign one. Proposition 4 says that home industrial price index grows in home share
θ of agricultural population, whereas foreign price index decreases, so relative price index grows. Influence of
industrial labor share growth is opposite — relative price index decreases with respect to industral labor share.
More important for further study of agglomeration is the study of relative welfare, i.e. utility value obtained
by representative consumer in equilibrium. Proposition 5 says that relative welfare always increases in the agri-
cultural share. Proposition 6 say that behavior of relative welfare in industrial labor share is more complicated
and generally non-monotone. Under given parameters, including transportation cost and agricultural labor share,
there can be zero, one, two or three interior values of industrial share yielding welfare equalization between the
two countries (such point is a candidate for interior equilibrium when migration is allowed). No more than one of
them is a candidate for a stable equilibrium. Under sufficiently small transportation costs for any fixed agricultural
population our industral workers are always relatively better off when having more industrial compatriots. But
under sufficiently big transportation costs for any fixed agricultural population there exist an optimal (for them)
share.
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 study long-run equilibria describing migration: agglomerated and interior respectively.
Obtained analytical results (as well as results of simulations) show that the general picture of agglomeration pro-
cesses differs depending on degree of region’s asymmetry. Under small asymmetry the general picture of ag-
glomeration patterns with respect to trade freeness is qualitatively similar to well-known one under symmetry
“tomahawk” picture, it becomes just asymmetric. We provide the formal proof for this robustness of symmetric
theory in the case of moderate asymmetry: any country can become the “core”. In contrast, under big asymmetry
the pattern is qualitatively different: only agriculturally big country can become the core in agglomeration process,
but the smaller one is doomed to be a periphery. We find the threshold or lower bound on asymmetry (in terns of
other parameters) when only one core is predetermined by “first nature.” Below this bound ambiguity remains, but
the higher is asymmetry, the more “probable” is agglomeration in the direction of the bigger country. Something
like this was previously shown in simulations, see Baldwin et. al (2003). Now we combine known symmetric
theory and known asymmetric simulations into general theoretical picture.
As to interior long-run equilibria, in section 4.2 we obtain comprehensive analytical results on their existence,
number and stability under given parameters, generalizing results from Robert-Nicoud (2005) and giving more
direct and intuitive proof.
To further motivate our interest in asymmetry of immobile (or, “agricultural”) populations, note that it may
be considered (ceteris paribus) as equivalent to the market potential differences. There is a series of empirical
evidences showing that this asymmetry causes unavoidable differences across regions in wages (nominal and real),
cost-of-living’s levels (or price indices) etc, see, for example, Cecchetti et al (2002), Hanson (2006), Roos (2006),
Beenstock and Felsenstein (2008), Klaesson and Larsson (2009).
Our study can be extended to other types of asymmetry, including consumer’s preferences dissimilarity studied
in Berliant and Kung (2009). Concerning the robustness of general pitchfork bifurcation patterns to asymmetry,
they expressed the following opinion: “... generically in all parameter paths this class of bifurcations does not
appear. In other words, conclusions drawn from the use of this bifurcation to generate a core-periphery pattern are
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not robust. Generically, this class of bifurcations is a myth, an urban legend.” We agree that bifurcation itself goes
away, but more important is that qualitative features and patterns of agglomeration still remain.
2 Core-Periphery Model
This paper studies the classical Krugman’s CP model, only with asymmetry of the two trading regions or countries:
“Home” H and “Foreign” F . The manufacturing sector in both countries is a standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition industry with specialized labor that produces varieties or brands of “industrial good”. Each manu-
facturing firm employs the labor of industrial workers and produces a single variety subject to increasing returns.
Namely, production of variety i requires a variable input involving m units of industrial-worker labor per unit of
output produced and a fixed input of f units of this labor. In symbols, the cost function is C(i) = ( f +m · x(i)) ·w,
where x is a firm’s output and w is the industrial workers’ wage. Note that wage w may differ across regions, while
fixed f and marginal variable m costs are the same for both H and F . In contrast, the agricultural sector produces
a homogeneous good under perfect competition and constant returns using only the labor of agricultural workers.
We normalize the model assuming that agricultural production takes ma = 1 unit of agricultural labor to make one
unit of the homogeneous good and agricultural fixed costs fa = 0.
The total amount of industrial labor denoted by L > 0 and La > 0 denotes total amount of agricultural labor.
The share of industral labor resided in home region H is a number λ ∈ [0,1], analogously, θ ∈ (0,1) the relative
share of agricultural population in region H. It implies that supplies of industral and agricultural labor in region
H are λL and θLa respectively. Analogously, labor supplies in region F are (1−λ )L and (1−θ)La. In the short-
run equilibrium concept is supposed that the values of shares λ and θ are fixed. Without loss of generality we
shall assume that θ > 1/2, i.e. agricultural population of home region is greater or equal to foreign agricultural
population. Perfectly competitive agricultural sector technology is uniform for both regions, the only difference
concerns the numbers of laborers. Transportation of agricultural good assumed costless, thus prices for both
countries are equal, which implies equalization of wage rates wa across regions. Agricultural marginal cost ma = 1,
consequently wa = 1.
The goods of both sectors are traded between countries, and trade in industral sector trade incur iceberg-type
trade costs, whereas trade in agricultural sector goods is frictionless. Specifically, it is costless to ship industrial
goods to local consumers but to sell one unit in another region, an industrial firm must produce and ship τ > 1
units. The idea is that τ − 1 units of the good “melt” in transit like an iceberg melts driving across an ocean. As
usual, τ captures all the costs of selling to distant markets, including transport costs and tariffs, τ − 1 being the
tariff-equivalent of these costs.
The typical consumer in each region has a two-tier utility function. The upper tier determines the consumer’s
allocation of expenditure between the homogeneous agricultural good, and the differentiated sector. The second
tier dictates the consumer’s preferences over the various differentiated industrial varieties and the choice within
this sector. The specific functional form of the upper tier is Cobb-Douglas that makes the sectoral expenditure
shares constant (under CES at the lower tier). In symbols, preferences of a typical consumers are described by
utility function:
U = Mµ ·Q1−µ , 0 < µ < 1 (1)
where Q is the consumption of the homogeneous good and M is the composite consumption utility of all differenti-
ated varieties of industrial goods. Traditionally the functional form of the lower tier is represented by CES-function
(constant elasticity of substitution) function M =
(
N
∑
i=1
qρi
) 1
ρ
for discrete varieties or M =
( N´
0
q(i)ρdi
) 1
ρ
in contin-
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uous case1. Here 0 < ρ < 1 is a parameter related to the elasticity of substitution 1 < σ < ∞ as follows ρ = σ−1σ .
Number N characterizes assortment of varieties or number of firms producing these varieties.
Each consumer (being of industrial or agricultural type) owns a unit of labor supplied inelastically to the market
in exchange of both types of goods produced in both countries, so the industrial consumer’s problem is
U(Mm,Qm)→max s.t.
ˆ NH
0
pHH(i)qmHH(i)di+
ˆ NF
0
pFH( j)qmFH( j)d j+1 ·Qm = wH
and the agricultural worker finds
U(Ma,Qa)→max s.t.
ˆ NH
0
pHH(i)qaHH(i)di+
ˆ NF
0
pFH(i)qaFH(i)di+1 ·Qa = 1,
where qmHH(i) denotes the industrial worker’s consumption of i-th variety produced and consumed in home region,
whereas qmFH( j) denotes her consumption of j-th variety imported from foreign country. Values pHH(i) and pFH( j)
are the corresponding prices. Recall that price of homogeneous agricultural good is normalized to 1. Values NH
and NF denote the numbers of firms in regions H and F respectively. Similar notations are used for consumer’s
problem of agricultural workers, and for consumers in another country. Now the home aggregate demand for
agriculture good is Q= λL ·Qm+θLa ·Qa , aggregate demands for each variety qHH(i) = λLqmHH(i)+θLaqaHH(i),
qHF(i) = (1−λ )LqmHF(i)+(1−θ)LaqaHF(i), etc.
It is well known under CES-function the analytical form of aggregate demand in country H for home produced
i-th variety is equal to
qHH(i) =
(wH ·λL+θLa) ·µ · p−σHH(i)´ NH
0 p
1−σ
HH ( j)d j+
´ NF
0 p
1−σ
FH ( j)d j
. (2)
In turn, aggregate demand in foreign region for i-th variety produced in H is equal to
qHF(i) =
(wF · (1−λ )L+(1−θ)La) ·µ · p−σHF(i)´ NH
0 p
1−σ
HF ( j)d j+
´ NF
0 p
1−σ
FF ( j)d j
. (3)
Home demand for foreign produced good qFH( j) and foreign demand for foreign produced good qFF( j),
j ∈ [0,NF ] may be obtained analogously.
Each home producer maximizes her profit
piH(i) = qHH(i) · (pHH(i)−wHm)+qHF(i) · (pHF(i)−wH · τ ·m)−wH · f ,
where qHH(i), qHF(i) are defined in (2) and (3), correctly anticipating the demand for his/her variety and perceiving
the competitors’ variables fixed, because everyone is “small enough”. Note that production costs m are also
uniform for both regions. Maximizing this profit with respect to pHH(i) and pHF(i) we obtain the following values
of prices
pHH(i)≡ pHH = wH ·m ·σσ −1 , pHF(i)≡ pHF =
wH · τ ·m ·σ
σ −1 , (4)
which are uniform for all product varieties i ∈ [0,N]. Analogously,
pFH( j)≡ pFH = wF ·m · τ ·σσ −1 , pFF( j)≡ pFF =
wF ·m ·σ
σ −1 (5)
1The limitations of Cobb-Douglas+CES modeling is that it is too specific to obtain more interesting comparative statics: it shows too
much stability of prices against shocks. Besides, use of Cobb–Douglas function makes CP model singular. Still, in the rest part of this
paper two-tier utility function with underlying CES tier will be used.
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The concept of short-run equilibrium implies that share λ is fixed (as well as θ ), whereas the free-entry
condition states that positiveness of profit in industry causes increasing of number of firms until profit becomes
zero. For example, for home producers this Zero-Profit Condition piH(i) = 0, taking into account formulas (2)-(5),
is of the following form
(wHλL+θLa)µ p−σHH · (pHH −wH ·m)
NH · p1−σHH +NF · p1−σFH
+
(wF(1−λ )L+(1−θ)La)µ p−σHF · (pHF −wH · τ ·m)
NH · p1−σHF +NF · p1−σFF
= wH f .
Let’s substitute for this pHH−wHm= wH ·m ·σσ −1 −wH ·m=
wH ·m
σ −1 and pHF−wH ·τ ·m=
wH · τ ·m
σ −1 into previous
equation. We obtain
(wH ·λL+θLa) ·µ · p−σHH
NH · p1−σHH +NF · p1−σFH
+
τ · (wF · (1−λ )L+(1−θ)La) ·µ · p−σHF
NH · p1−σHF +NF · p1−σFF
=
(σ −1) f
m
.
The left-hand expression is equal to total output of home-produced variety covering the total demand. This pro-
duction requires the following amount of industrial labor
f +m
(σ −1) f
m
= f ·σ .
Consequently the total industrial labor demand is equal to NH · f ·σ and from labor market equilibrium condition
we obtain that the mass of home firms
NH =
λL
f ·σ ,
analogously
NF =
(1−λ )L
f ·σ .
Substituting expressions for prices (4), (5) and just obtained NH , NF into Zero-Profit equation we obtain, after
simplifying, the following equation:
µ
(
λwH +θ · LaL
λw1−σH +(1−λ )ϕ ·wF 1−σ
+
ϕ
(
(1−λ )wF +(1−θ)LaL
)
λϕwH 1−σ +(1−λ )w1−σF
)
= wσH , (6)
where ϕ = τ1−σ ∈ (0,1) may be interpreted as a measure of trade “freeness” or “openness”. Taking into account
normalization of agricultural parameters (i.e. marginal costs wage rate are supposed to be equal to 1), a commodity
balance of agricultural product may be written as
(1−µ)(wH ·λL+wF · (1−θ)L+1 ·La) = La
or
λwH +(1−λ )wF = µ1−µ ·
La
L
(7)
where La, L are the total amounts of agricultural and industrial labor in the world, wH and wF are industrial
wages, home and foreign respectively, µ characterizes expenditure share of industrial production and λ is a share
of industrial labor in home region.
It will be shown further that the equation system (6), (7) defines short run equilibrium well. This system is not
analytically solvable, which leads to the pessimistic notion about the intractability of the CP model mentioned in
Introduction. One of the aims of this article is to show that this insolubility is not a hindrance for analytical study
of CP model.
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In contrast, the concept of long-run equilibrium implies that there can be a location choice. Agricultural labor-
ers still assumed to be immobile, but share of industrial workers λ can change due to migration between the regions.
Let’s fix an arbitrary λ ∈ (0,1) and calculate all short-run equilibrium values of prices pHH , pHF , pFH , pFF , de-
mands qmHH ,q
m
HFq
m
FHq
m
FF , and numbers of firms NH , NF (see (4), (5)). To obtain the demand of industrial workers
only, it is sufficient to put La = 0 in (2) and (3). Then substitute the obtained equilibrium values of industrial labor
demand (for both countries) into utility function (1), as result we get the industrial welfares VH(λ ) and VF(λ ) for
Home and Foreign countries at the value of share λ ∈ (0,1) (for rather explicit formula of welfare see subsection
3.4). An inequality VH(λ ) > VF(λ ) is considered in long run as incentive to migration from Foreign to Home
country and vice versa. One of the popular migration dynamics is so-called ad hoc migration equation:
λ˙ = λ (VH(λ )− (λVH(λ )+(1−λ )VF(λ ))) = λ (1−λ )(VH(λ )−VF(λ ))
In the long-run equilibrium the market and agglomeration determine the equilibrium value λ 0 of share of industrial
labor in our country, such that no migration occurs: λ˙ = 0. The equilibria can be “agglomerated” that means
either λ 0 = 0 or λ 0 = 1, i.e. one country becomes pure agricultural one. Alternatively, a “interior equilibrium”
implies both countries producing manufacturing goods and the equal real wages for both regions VH(λ 0) =VF(λ 0),
0 < λ 0 < 1.
We are going to analyze the asymmetric CP model in two stages. First we derive solutions and their com-
parative statics for short-run equilibria, interpreted as equilibrium in international trade, and having independent
value itself. Then, using these results we completely describe the long-run equilibria, i.e., the resulting agglomer-
ation/dispersion outcomes.
3 Short-run Equilibria
3.1 Equilibrium equations and existence
We get the following two equations (see equations (6), (7) above) connecting nominal wages with exogenous
parameters
µ
(
λwH +θ · LaL
λw1−σH +(1−λ )ϕ ·wF 1−σ
+
ϕ
(
(1−λ )wF +(1−θ)LaL
)
λϕwH 1−σ +(1−λ )w1−σF
)
= wσH ,
La
L
=
1−µ
µ
· (λwH +(1−λ )wF) ,
where ϕ = τ1−σ is “trade freeness” and wH and wF are wages of industrial labor in Home and Foreign countries
respectively.
Substituting second equation into the first one we derive the following simpler one with respect to relative
wage wHwF :
(1−λ )
[
1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2)−ϕ ·
(
wH
wF
)σ]−
−λ
[(
1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2)) wHwF −ϕ ·(wHwF )1−σ]= 0 (8)
Solution of this equation allows to obtain nominal wages from the following equation, which is equivalent to (7)
wH =
µ
1−µ ·
La · wHwF
L
(
λ wHwF +(1−λ )
) . (9)
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Based on the simplification obtained, the following result generalizes existence and uniqueness of short-run
equilibrium (see Mossay, 2006) to the asymmetric case.
Proposition 1. i) There exists a unique positive value of Relative Nominal Wage wHwF defined by equation (8).
ii) This value satisfies the following inequalities ϕ
1
σ < wHwF < ϕ
− 1σ . In the case of “costless trade”, ϕ = 1, an
identity wH ≡ wF holds (“integrated equilibrium”).
For analytical proof see Lemma 1 in Appendix A.
From equations (8) one can see that relative wage depends on shares θ ,λ only but not on absolute values
of industrial and agricultural labors (L and La). Similarly, based on (9), the wage itself depends on fraction of
industrial labor to agricultural one
La
L
but not on the absolute size of global labor. Note that this is a natural
consequence of the linear homogeneity of preferences. Costs do not affect wages.
3.2 Changes in wages
From equation (8), the relative wage is an implicit function of labor shares θ and λ , as well as trade freeness ϕ and
utility function parameters µ and σ . We start deriving the comparative statics of equilibria with respect to labor
shares.
Denote x = wHwF for short, then equation (8) takes the following form
(1−λ )(1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2)−ϕ · xσ )−λ (1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2))x−ϕx1−σ ) = 0.
An implicit function x(λ ,θ ,µ,ϕ,σ) is solution to this equation. Immediately one can derive two special cases.
Under ϕ = 0 transportation costs are infinitely large, trade is impossible and this autarky yields wHwF =
(1−λ )θ
(1−θ)λ
which increases with respect to θ , decreases with respect to λ and remains unaffected by other parameters. Under
ϕ = 1 trade is costless and so-called integrated equilibrium yields wage equalization wHwF ≡ 1 independently of any
parameters. The equalization was known under symmetry of labor, but now we see that it is a general fact.
Now consider the most interesting case 0 < ϕ < 1 of non-trivial trade cost. Applying the implicit function
theorem to previous equation we obtain the following
Proposition 2. (Comparative statics with respect to agricultural labor share)
i) Nominal wage in Home country wH increases while foreign wage wF decreases with respect to Home agri-
cultural population share θ , thereby relative industrial wage wHwF also increases.
ii) Home nominal wage is greater than foreign wage (wH > wF ) iff the share of home agricultural labor is
sufficiently large, namely θ > λ +
(1−2λ )ϕ
(1+ϕ)(1−µ) . The opposite strict inequality implies reverse wage relation.
iii) Under sufficiently big asymmetry of industrial labor, namely λ +
(1−2λ )ϕ
(1+ϕ)(1−µ) > 1 or
λ +
(1−2λ )ϕ
(1+ϕ)(1−µ) < 0 there is no wage equalization for any shares θ ∈ (0,1).
For analytical proofs see Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix A.
Figure 2 illustrates all these facts by simulations (using Mathematica 6.3). Taking three values of industrial
labor share: (small, medium and big) we observe monotonic increase of wages predicted by claim (i) of Proposition
and three qualitatively different outcomes predicted by claims (ii), (iii). Namely, too small industrial share λ = 0.05
yield small industrial wage wH <wF everywhere. Similarly, big share λ = 0.85 yield big industrial wage wH >wF ,
for all values of θ . Only under medium industrial share wages wH ,wF may be equalized for some critical value of
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Figure 2: Left-hand plot: Relative wages with respect to θ for µ = 0.7, ρ = 0.75, ϕ = 0.75 and three values of λ .
Right-hand plot: Relative wages with respect to θ for λ = 0.65, ρ = 0.75, ϕ = 0.75 and three values of µ .
θ 0 ≈ 0.6. Also we plot relative wage three values of expenditure share – µ = 0.01 (close to perfect competition),
intermediate µ = 0.5 and µ = 0.99 (close to monopolistic competition).
To interpret the monotonic increase, take into account that agricultural share θ indirectly reflects the size of the
market for industrial goods. Bigger market requires more industrial labor whose supply is fixed in the short-run.
Note also there is no difference in tendencies for perfectly competitive and monopolistic competitive sectors of
economy. It should be mentioned only that for “almost monopolistic competitive” economies (µ ≈ 1) relative
wage is (almost) neutral to agricultural labor allocation θ because of its negligibility. On the other hand, in the
case when economy close to perfect competition (µ ≈ 0) its monopolistic competitive sector is more sensitive to
home market size. As to realism of monotonicity conclusion, there is empirical evidence that market size really
positively affects wages and that the industrial structure matters, see, for example, discussion in Klaesson and
Larsson (2009).
Considering dependence of wages on λ we find that in this case answer is ambiguous and heavily depends
on agricultural heterogeneity index defined as follows α = 2θ − 1 = θ − (1− θ) (we assume that θ > 1/2). It
measures degree of asymmetry in the agricultural labor distribution, α = 0 for symmetric model and α = 1 in the
case of total asymmetry for θ = 1. Define the following value
ϕw(µ,α) =
√√√√√ 1−α2(1+µ
1−µ
)2−α2 ∈ (0,1)
which increases with respect to asymmetry α and decreases w.r.t. expenditure share µ .
Proposition 3. (Comparative statics with respect to industrial labor share)
When “freeness” exceeds the threshold: ϕ > ϕw(µ,α), then relative industrial wage wHwF increases with respect to
industrial labor share λ but decreases under smaller “freeness” ϕ < ϕw(µ,α) . In the case ϕ = ϕw(µ,α) relative
wage wHwF does not depend on λ .
For analytical proof see Lemma 4 in Appendix A.
We can also reformulate Proposition 3 in equivalent form as follows
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Figure 3: Left-hand plot: Relative wages with respect to λ for θ = 0.65, ρ = 0.75, ϕ = 0.5 and three values of µ .
Right-hand plot: Threshold values of expenditure share µw with respect to asymmetry measure α = 2θ − 1 for
three values of ϕ .
Corollary 1. Relative wage wHwF increases with respect to industrial labor share λ in the case
µ > µw(ϕ,α), decreases when µ < µw(ϕ,α) and does not depend on λ for µ = µw(ϕ,α) where
µw(ϕ,α) =
√
1− (1−ϕ2)α2−ϕ√
1− (1−ϕ2)α2+ϕ .
This corollary allows more clear interpretation of struggle in the outcomes between agglomeration and disper-
sion forces. On a near perfectly-competitive market (µ ≈ 0) dispersion forces prevail, and increasing the home
industral labor share λ (or, equivalently number of firms NH =
λL
f ·σ ) negatively affects the relative wage
wH
wF
.
On the other hand, on a monopolistic-competitive market (µ ≈ 1) domination of agglomeration forces tends to
increase the relative wage with respect to λ . Increasing the expenditure share µ of the monopolistic competitive
sector weakens dispersion forces, while agglomeration forces are enhanced. At threshold value µw, agglomeration
and dispersion forces compensate each other. On left-hand side of Figure 2 three outcomes of force’s struggle
are represented: when expenditure share µ = 0.01 is small dispersion wins, when it is large µ = 0.99 then ag-
glomeration prevail and only for µ = µw ≈ 0.317714 tie happens. The right-hand side illustrates dependence of
threshold value on asymmetry measure of agricultural labor allocation α = 2θ −1 ∈ (0,1) and trade “freeness” ϕ
for three values. Due to Corollary 1, an area above the threshold curve µw(ϕ,α) covers the cases of increasing of
relative wage. We see that increasing of trade “freeness” makes this area wider, i.e. helps generate agglomeration.
The same occurs under increasing of asymmetry in the agricultural population allocation α = 2θ − 1. The large
concentration of agricultural population in home country attracts more industrial (i.e. agglomeration) forces and
amplifies their impact.
3.3 Changes in Price Indices (or Agricultural Welfare)
Prices pi j defined in equations (4)-(5) allow to define the index of cost of living, somewhat vaguely called “price
index”, PH for Home-Country and PF for foreign one. This index is the expenditure function at utility 1, i.e. the
amount of money needed to maintain a unit level of gross utility under these prices. It is standard in CP model to
express the index in both as
PH =
(
λw1−σH +(1−λ )w1−σF ϕ
) 1
1−σ , PF =
(
λϕw1−σH +(1−λ )wF 1−σ
) 1
1−σ
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(see for details Comparative Statics of Price Indices in Appendix I).
Since agricultural workers always have unit income, the inverse price index directly measures their utility as
V a =
wa
Pµ
=
1
Pµ
. The changes in both with respect to relative agricultural population are described as follows.
Proposition 4. i) Nominal price index for any region increases with respect to its own agricultural population
share, while foreign nominal price decreases, i.e., PH increases in θ whereas PF decreases.
ii) Relative price indices PH/PF increases with respect to agricultural population share θ , thereby relative
welfare of agricultural workers V aH/V
a
F =
1
(PH/PF)µ
becomes more favorable for the country with decreasing θ .
iii) Relative price indices PH/PF decreases with respect to industrial population share λ , thereby relative
welfare of agricultural workers V aH/V
a
F =
1
(PH/PF)µ
becomes more favorable for the country with increasing λ .
iv) Price indices PH and PF (as well as agricultural welfares V aH and V
a
F ) are equalized under condition
1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ)
1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ) =
(
λ
1−λ
) σ
σ−1
.
For all given θ ,ϕ,µ,σ there exists λ ∈ (0,1) satisfying this equation. On the other hand, for some values of
λ ,ϕ,µ,σ price indices of two countries may be non-equalizible for all θ ∈ (0,1).
v) Price index inequality PH > PF holds if and only if
θ >
(1−µ)+µϕ
(1−µ)(1−ϕ) −
(1−µ)+(1+µ)ϕ
(1−µ)(1−ϕ)
(
1+
(
λ
1−λ
) σ
σ−1
)
or, equivalently,
λ
1−λ <
(
1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ)
1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ)
)ρ
.
For analytical proof see Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 in Appendix A.
Note that left-hand side of equalization condition 1−((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ)1−((1−µ)θ+µ)(1−ϕ) under variation of θ ∈ (0,1) takes the
values in limited interval between ϕ(1−µ)+µϕ and
(1−µ)+µϕ
ϕ , whereas the right-hand side changes in unlimited
interval, i.e,
(
λ
1−λ
) σ
σ−1 ∈ (0,∞) for various λ ∈ (0,1). Thereby, there always exist some shares of industrial
labor λ that equalize price indices and welfares of agricultural workers, but changes in agricultural labor may be
insufficient for this task under given θ ∈ (0,1) and other parameters. In other words, migration of industrial labor
producing varieties matters more for agricultural welfares equalization than changes in agricultural labor, even if
concede possibility of the agricultural migration.
At Figure 4 the proposition and all three (equalizible and non-equalizible) situations are represented. We see
that under sufficient asymmetry in industrial labor, price indices need not equalize between countries, it means
Law of one price fails. We can compare our two propositions with traditional international trade and factor-price
equalization in Hecksher-Ohlin model with specific factors used in two industries. Like there, factor endowments
of the countries matter in our model and differences in wages or prices depend on parameters in natural direction:
a factor in shorter supply becomes more expensive.
To mention realism of these conclusion, an empirical study Roos (2003) claims that “the most important factors
driving price level differentials are population size and the average wage level” (see also Cecchetti et al (2002)).
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Figure 4: Changes in relative price index with respect to asymmetry in θ for µ = 0.7, ρ = 0.75, ϕ = 0.75 and
three values of λ .
3.4 Changes in industrial welfares
The industrial welfare in a country is defined by dividing industrial nominal wage w by the price index P. For
Home country it equals to
VH =
(L fσ)
µ
1−σ( mσ
σ−1
)µ · wH(
λw1−σH +(1−λ )w1−σF ϕ
) µ
1−σ
,
and for Foreign it is
VF =
(L fσ)
µ
1−σ( mσ
σ−1
)µ · wF(
λϕw1−σH +(1−λ )w1−σF
) µ
1−σ
.
Thus relative welfare may be expressed in terms of relative wage as follows
VH
VF
=
wH
wF
λ +(1−λ )ϕ
(
wH
wF
)σ−1
λϕ+(1−λ )
(
wH
wF
)σ−1

µ
σ−1
. (10)
Next proposition extends the comparative statics of previous two propositions onto real wages (utilities) of indus-
trial labor in two countries.
Proposition 5. i) Relative industrial real wage VHVF as well as home welfare VH of industrial labor increase with
respect to home agricultural population share θ .
ii) There exist values of λ ,ϕ,µ,σ when industrial welfares of two countries are non-equalizible, i.e., VH 6=VF
for all θ ∈ (0,1).
For analytical proof see Lemma 5 in Appendix A.
Figure 5 illustrates monotonicity claim (i) and proves claim (ii) by example. In contrast to previous proposi-
tions, it is not easy here to obtain explicit condition of non-equability. Our conjecture induced by this and other
simulations is that non-eligibility happens when industrial labor asymmetry is sufficiently large.
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Figure 5: Comparative statics of relative welfare with respect to θ for µ = 0.7, ρ = 0.75, ϕ = 0.75 and three values
of λ .
Interpreting the monotonicity observed, we can say that in this case there is no conflicts between perfect
competitive and monopolistic competitive sectors. Indeed, in the case µ = 0 we obtain from (10) that relative
welfare is similar to relative wage
wH
wF
that is increasing function with respect to agricultural labor share θ . To
approximate monopolistic competitive case µ = 1 we use equivalent representation of relative welfare (see for
details Comparative Statics of Industrial Welfares in Appendix A)
VH
VF
=
(
x
ρ
µ
(1−µ)θ − ((1−µ)θ +µ)ϕx
(1−µ)(1−θ)x− ((1−θ)+µθ)ϕ
) µ
σ−1
,
where x =
(
wH
wF
)σ
. Then for µ = 1 we obtain that relative welfare is similar to positive power of relative wage(
wH
wF
) 2σ−1
σ−1
that is increasing function with respect to agricultural labor share θ .
Comparative statics with respect to industrial labor share λ is more sophisticated. Traditionally general case
is divided into two sub-cases. The first one is so called Black Hole, characterized by inequality ρ =
σ −1
σ
6 µ ,
or equivalently,
1
σ
= 1− ρ > 1− µ with the following interpretation — love for industrial variety exceeds the
expenditure share for agricultural good. The opposite case characterized by No-Black-Hole Condition ρ > µ
will be considered as main one. In this case one can define the following critical point
ϕB(ρ,µ,α) =
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√√√√√√ 1−α
2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2
−α2
where α = 2θ −1, coinciding in symmetric case α = 0 with break-point ϕB mentioned in Introduction.
Proposition 6. i) Let Black-Hole Condition ρ 6 µ holds. Then relative welfare VH
VF
increases with respect
to industrial labor share λ . There exists the unique value λ 0 ∈ (0,1) yielding industrial welfare equalization
VH(λ 0) =VF(λ 0).
ii) Assume No-Black-Hole Condition ρ > µ holds and ϕ > ϕB(ρ,µ,α). Then relative welfare VH
VF
increases
with respect to industrial labor share λ and there is at most one value λ 0 ∈ (0,1) yielding welfare equalization
VH(λ 0) =VF(λ 0).
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iii) Assume No-Black-Hole Condition ρ > µ holds and ϕ < ϕB(ρ,µ,α). Then relative welfare
VH
VF
increases
with respect to industrial labor share λ for sufficiently small λ > 0 and derivative ∂
∂λ
VH
VF
changes its sign not more
than twice for all λ ∈ (0,1). Therefore there is at most one three values λ ∈ (0,1) yielding welfare equalization
VH(λ ) =VF(λ ).
For analytical proof see Lemmas 9, 10 in Appendix A.
We obtain this threshold effect in terms of trade freeness ϕ . Proposition 6 may be equivalently reformulated
in terms of threshold value of expenditure share µ , though there is no the corresponding explicit form of this
threshold.
Corollary 2. For all (ρ,α,ϕ) ∈ (0,1)3 there is defined a continuous function µB(ρ,α,ϕ) satisfying the following
conditions:
i) function values 0 < µB(ρ,α,ϕ)< ρ , moreover µB(ρ,α,ϕ) decreases with respect to ϕ and α
ii) For all µ > µB(ρ,α,ϕ) relative welfare VH
VF
increases with respect to industrial labor share λ and there
exists not more than one value λ 0 ∈ (0,1) yielding welfare equalization VH(λ 0) =VF(λ 0)
iii) For µ < µB(ρ,α,ϕ) relative welfare
VH
VF
increases with respect to industrial labor share λ for sufficiently
small λ > 0 and derivative ∂
∂λ
VH
VF
changes its sign not more than twice for all λ ∈ (0,1). Therefore there exists
not more than three values λ ∈ (0,1) yielding industrial welfare equalization VH(λ ) =VF(λ ).
Indeed, the threshold function µB(ρ,α,ϕ) may be obtained as implicit function defined by equation
F(ϕ,ρ,µ,α) = ϕ− ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√√√√√√ 1−α
2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2
−α2
= 0.
It is obvious that F(ϕ,ρ,µ,α) strictly increases with respect to µ , i.e.
∂F
∂µ
> 0 for all admissible arguments, thus
by the Implicit Function Theorem there exists differentiable function µB(ρ,α,ϕ) and
∂µ
∂α
=−
(
∂F
∂α
)
(
∂F
∂µ
) < 0, ∂µ
∂ϕ
=−
(
∂F
∂ϕ
)
(
∂F
∂µ
) < 0
because F(ϕ,ρ,µ,α) obviously increases with respect to α and ϕ . We need not consider Black-Hole case sepa-
rately, since µ > ρ implies µ > µB(ρ,α,ϕ). In other words, Black Hole is simply a partial case of monopolistic
competition’s prevailing.
Note that equalization values VH(λ 0) = VF(λ 0) are exactly interior long run equilibrium values of industrial
labor shares. More detailed consideration of interior long run equilibria is postponed until section 4.2. Claims
(ii), (iii) with No-Black-Hole Condition are illustrated in Figure 6. When “freeness” ϕ increases gradually from
0.003, to 0.1, the sinus-shape curve of relative welfare
VH
VF
(λ ) becomes less and less steep in the middle, arriving
finally at monotone increasing shape. The curve changes as a piece of wire, whose left end is pulled down but
right end up (seemingly, all curves turn around one point, but it is an illusion). In the beginning, under 0.003, the
curve intersects the horizontal line
VH
VF
= 1 only once, as predicted by claim (iv) with one utility-equalization point.
Then, at some stage before ϕ = 0.01 the right end hits 1 and at the next moment two interior equilibria emerge, the
right one being unstable because the curve intersects 1 from below. These two equilibria, stable and unstable, are
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Figure 6: Different patterns of relative welfare for θ = 0.55, µ = 0.2, ρ = 0.25 and various values of freeness ϕ .
supplemented by the third equilibrium (unstable one) after the left end of the curve hits 1 (say, under ϕ = 0.02),
but after bigger ϕ = 0.01 the middle and the rightmost equilibria disappear together, only one unstable intersection
is possible. Similar picture—one intersection from below—remains true under further increase of ϕ > 0.01, and
remains also under Black-Hole Condition discussed in claim (ii), for all ϕ . Note that increasing of relative welfare
VH
VF
reflects predominance of agglomeration forces with direction toward home country, while decreasing reflects
the opposite process. Figure 6 demonstrates also that increasing of trade freeness supports agglomeration forces.
Further, Figure 7 illustrates how strengthening of monopolistic competition (i.e. increasing of expenditure
share µ) changes correlation of agglomeration and dispersion forces. For small values of µ dispersion forces
prevail and relative welfare decreases forming stable interior long run equilibria (see for details section 4.2). For
sufficiently large values of µ outcome is opposite — relative welfare increases with respect to home industrial
labor share. As for intermediate values — for example, µ = 0.55 — dynamics of relative welfare may change not
more then twice.
Possible absence of interior utility equalization under sufficiently big agricultural asymmetry occurring under
θ = 0.9 or θ = 0.1 is illustrated in left-hand side of Figure 8. The industrial workers neighboring very big agricul-
tural population benefit so much from this that this cannot be completely outweighed by any change in their own
population. Finally, right-hand side of Figure 8 illustrates how threshold value µB(ρ,α,ϕ) depends on asymmetry
in agricultural labor allocation α = 2θ − 1 and trade freeness ϕ . Recall that area of relative welfare’s increasing
lies to the right of the curve. The more free is trade, the wider is this area, i.e. increasing of trade freeness inten-
sify agglomeration forces. Moreover, increasing of asymmetry in agricultural population’s allocation also amplify
agglomeration.
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Figure 7: Different patterns of relative welfare for θ = 0.6, ϕ = 0.005, ρ = 0.75 and various values of expenditure
share λ .
Figure 8: Left-hand plot: Absent utility equalization under big agricultural asymmetry: θ = 0.9, µ = 0.25, ϕ = 0.7,
ρ = 0.75.
Right-hand plot: Threshold values of expenditure share µB with respect to asymmetry measure α = 2θ − 1 for
three values of ϕ .
4 Asymmetry in Long Run
4.1 Agglomerated Long-Run Equilibria
The most popular migration dynamics model is so called ad hoc dynamics for industrial labor share λ
λ˙ = M(λ ) = λ (1−λ )(VH(λ )−VF(λ )) .
From this point of view there are two agglomerated long-run equilibria λ 0 = 0 and λ 0 = 1 which are steady
states of this differential equation. Stability conditions for this type of dynamics may be standardly expressed as
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Black Hole case µ > ρ Symmetric No-Black Hole case ρ > µ, α = 0
Figure 9: Symmetric patterns of agglomeration stability
∂M
∂λ
(0) < 0 and
∂M
∂λ
(1) < 0 which is equivalent to inequalities
VH
VF
(0) < 1 and
VH
VF
(1) > 1, respectively. Note
that these inequalities may be well interpreted without any differential equations, the first inequality means that
all industrial workers left Home country and none want to return, the second one means that all gathered in Home
country and none want to leave.
In symmetric case θ = 1/2 one can obtain one of two typical pictures of stability depending on transportation
costs τ > 1 or, which is equivalent, on trade freeness ϕ = τ1−σ ∈ (0,1]. The first one is so called “Black Hole”
when both agglomerated equilibria are stable for all values of ϕ ∈ (0,1] and it appears in the case ρ = σ −1
σ
6 µ .
Under “No Black Hole Condition” ρ > µ there exists “sustain point” ϕS ∈ (0,1) such that both agglomerated
equilibria are unstable for all ϕ ∈ (0,ϕS) and they are both stable for all ϕ ∈ (ϕS,1].
Here the bold lines are sets of stable agglomerated long run equilibria for various values of trade freeness ϕ .
Asymmetry in agricultural population brings two new cases. Without loss of generality we assume that θ > 1/2.
Proposition 7. i) Let Black-Hole condition ρ 6 µ holds. Then both agglomerated equilibria λ = 0 and λ = 1 are
stable for all values of ϕ,θ .
ii) Let No-Black-Hole condition ρ > µ holds and µ > ρ
1+2ρ
. Then there exist 0 < ϕS1 6 ϕS0 < 1 such that
agglomerated equilibrium λ = 0 is stable if and only if ϕ > ϕS0 and λ = 1 is stable if and only if ϕ > ϕ
S
1 . Moreover,
ϕS0 = ϕ
S
1 if and only if θ = 1/2. Sustain point ϕ
S
0 strictly increases with respect to θ while ϕ
S
1 strictly decreases.
iii) Let No-Black-Hole condition ρ > µ holds and µ <
ρ
1+2ρ
. Then there exist 0 < ϕS1 6 ϕS0 6 1 such that
agglomerated equilibrium λ = 0 is stable if and only if ϕ > ϕS0 and λ = 1 is stable if and only if ϕ > ϕ
S
1 . Moreover,
ϕS0 = ϕ
S
1 if and only if θ = 1/2, ϕ
S
0 < 1 for all θ <
ρ+µ
2(1−µ)ρ and ϕ
S
0 ≡ 1 for all θ >
ρ+µ
2(1−µ)ρ . Sustain point
ϕS0 strictly increases with respect to θ for all θ ∈
[
1
2
,
ρ+µ
2(1−µ)ρ
)
while ϕS1 strictly decreases for all θ .
For technical details see Lemmas 12, 13 in Appendix B.
The asymmetric Black-Hole case i) is identical to symmetric Black Hole. More exactly, for sufficiently large
weight of industrial sector, asymmetry degree of agricultural sector does not affect direction of relative welfare
change, i.e. it is a case of domination of monopolistic competition suppressing agricultural heterogeneity.
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Moderate asymmetry α <
(1+ρ)µ
(1−µ)ρ , No-Black-Hole Large asymmetry α >
(1+ρ)µ
(1−µ)ρ , No-Black-Hole
Figure 10: Asymmetric patterns of agglomeration stability
Sub-case ii) is analogous to its symmetric case except that each agglomerated equilibrium has specified sus-
tain point ϕS0 for λ = 0 and ϕ
S
1 for λ = 1. Finally, sub-case iii) when one of sustain points disappears is specific
to “sufficiently large” asymmetry in agricultural labor allocation. It is obvious that increasing of trade freeness
supports agglomeration in both directions, while asymmetry in agricultural population is favorable for agglomer-
ation in big country only. For sufficiently large measure of monopolistic competition µ > ρ
1+2ρ
the general (i.e.
non-directed) agglomeration has some influence and ambiguity in agglomeration directions still remains, though
asymmetry makes one of directions “more probable”. In opposite case, when monopolistic competitive sector is
sufficiently weak, i.e. µ <
ρ
1+2ρ
directed agglomeration prevails and for sufficiently large asymmetry ambiguity
disappears.
Note additionally that for any given ρ > µ and θ sustain points ϕS0 , ϕ
S
1 may be found as the smallest roots of
equations
G(ϕ) = θ(1−µ)ϕ µ−ρρ +(1−θ(1−µ))ϕ µ+ρρ = 1,
H(ϕ) = (1−θ)(1−µ)ϕ µ−ρρ +(1− (1−θ)(1−µ))ϕ µ+ρρ = 1,
respectively (see proof of Lemma 13 in Appendix B). On the Figure 11 functions G(ϕ), H(ϕ) are plotted for
No-Black-Hole (left-hand side) and Black-Hole (right-hand side) cases. Note that ϕ = 1 is trivial root of both
equations and sometimes (namely, for all θ > ρ+µ
2(1−µ)ρ ) it is a smallest one. In other cases ϕ
S
0 ,ϕ
S
1 ∈ (0,1). In
No-Black-Hole case ρ > µ for all ϕ ∈ (0,1) inequalities ϕ µ+ρρ < 1 < ϕ µ−ρρ hold, while left-hand sides of these
equations are the weighted sums of terms ϕ
µ−ρ
ρ and ϕ
µ+ρ
ρ . It is obvious that increasing in agricultural labor share
θ , or equivalently in corresponding weight coefficient, pulls plot of G(ϕ) up, while plot of H(ϕ) goes down. Thus
sustain points ϕS0 , ϕ
S
1 shift to the right and left, correspondingly. In Black-Hole case changes in θ do not have
significant consequences.
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Figure 11: Sustain points: No-Black-Hole and Black-Hole cases
4.2 Interior Long-run Equilibria
Interior long-run equilibria may be defined as interior steady states λ 0 ∈ (0,1) of the same ad hoc dynamic equation
λ˙ = M(λ ) = λ (1−λ )(VH(λ )−VF(λ )) .
which implies the equality of industrial real wages in both regions VH(λ 0) =VF(λ 0). Stability conditions for this
type of dynamics may be standardly expressed as
∂M
∂λ
(λ 0)< 0 which is equivalent to inequalities
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(λ 0)< 0.
Note that these inequalities may be also interpreted without any differential equations. It means that the further
immigration in Home country causes deceasing of relative welfare and leads to backward migration.
Recall the definition of break point
ϕB =
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√√√√ 1− (2θ −1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2− (2θ −1)2
Proposition 8. i) Let Black-Hole Condition ρ 6 µ hold. Then there is at most one single interior long run
equilibrium and ,in case of existence, it is always unstable.
ii) Let No-Black-Hole Condition ρ > µ holds and ϕ > ϕB. Then there is at most one interior long-run equi-
librium and ,in case of existence, it is always unstable.
iii) Let No-Black-Hole Condition ρ > µ holds and 0 < ϕ < ϕB. Then there is at most three interior long-run
equilibria.
Numerical simulation show that for appropriate values of the parameters, each of the cases in “not more than
n” is possible, i.e. for ϕ > ϕB there are examples of exactly one or without any interior equilibrium, and for
ϕ < ϕB there are examples of exactly three, two, one and none of interior equilibria. In fact, Figures 6, 7, 8
show us all cases of interior equilibria mentioned above. More exactly, Figure 7 shows single unstable Black Hole
equilibria for µ = 0.8 and µ = 0.9 (µ > ρ = 0.75), Figure 8, left-hand side, shows absence of interior equilibria
for No-Black-Hole case and ϕ = 0.7 > ϕB = 0.402985, Figure 6 shows the cases of one, two and three interior
equilibria for various values of ϕ < ϕB = 0.0740226. Note that indication of equilibrium stability is intersection
“from above”, while inverse direction of intersection characterizes unstable equilibria. For each specified value
of freeness ϕ all possible cases of number and stability type of interior equilibria are described in Lemma 16 in
Appendix B. Here we classify the synthetic patterns of long run equilibria, including agglomerated and interior
ones.
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Pattern 0: No Break-Point, Sustain Points ϕS0 = ϕ
S
1 = 0
Figure 12: Black Hole map: µ = 0.5 > ρ = 0.25, θ = 0.6
These patterns are represented by simulation results for specified values of ρ,µ,θ and for all values of in-
dustrial labor share λ and trade freeness ϕ . Dark area (referred as “sea”) represents cases where relative welfare
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) < 1, light area (referred as “shore”) corresponds to case
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) > 1 and “coastline”
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) = 1
represents set of all interior equilibria. Consider a “map” of Black Hole case as an example. We see that all
“southern” (i.e. for λ = 0) points are “in the sea”
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) < 1 and thus stable, all “northern” (i.e. for λ = 1)
points are “on the shore”
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) > 1 and thus stable, and “coastline” consists of unstable interior equilibria,
because going north we cross it from sea to shore, i.e.
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) increases with respect to λ . Figure 12 represent
all Black Hole cases, the only difference in other Black Hole cases concerns an exact form of coastline. Arrows
show directions of industral labor migration, more exactly, the upward arrow indicates immigration into Home
country, the downward one — the opposite process.
The rest classification concerns No-Black-Hole cases only. Let’s define one more threshold value for trade
freeness ϕ , the “turn point”, that will be useful for our classification
ϕT (θ ,ρ,µ) =
√
max
{
0,
(1−θ)(θρ− (1+θρ)µ)
θ((1−θ)ρ+(1+θρ)µ)
}
.
It distinguish the possible cases of relative welfare behavior in agglomerated state λ = 1. Namely, relative welfare
VH
VF
increases in λ = 1 if and only if ϕ > ϕT (see for details Lemma 11 in Appendix A). Note that in perfectly com-
petitive case (i.e. µ = 0) this value ϕT (θ ,ρ,0) = 1 and for sufficiently large weight of monopolistic competitive
sector µ > θρ
1+θρ
we obtain ϕT (θ ,ρ,µ)≡ 0.
Consider the class of “asymmetric tomahawks” (see Proposition 7-iii, case of θ <
ρ+µ
2(1−µ)ρ which is equiva-
lent to α = 2θ −1 < (1−ρ)µ
(1−µ)ρ ) or in new “geographic” interpretation, class of “maps with two coastlines”, north-
ern and southern ones. It may be divided into two subclasses by distinction ϕT < ϕS1 and ϕ
T > ϕS1 . The first case is
characterized by “hooked” northern coastline, i.e. it goes first eastwards and then turns westwards. In other words,
northern coastline contains U-turn point characterized by “longitude” ϕU . Figure 13 illustrates this case by two ex-
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Pattern 1 Pattern 2
µ = 0.25, ρ = 0.75, θ = 0.501 µ = 0.25, ρ = 0.75, θ = 0.55
Figure 13: Patterns for “hooked coastline” ϕT < ϕS1
amples: in the left-hand side plot ϕT = 0 and hook is obvious, in right-hand one ϕT = 0.209278 < ϕS1 = 0.226391
and counter motion of coastline is almost invisible, but still exists. There is a small difference between two
“hooked” patterns in Figure 13: for left-hand side case we have ϕS0 < ϕ
E , while for right-hand side one an inequal-
ity ϕE < ϕS0 holds.
Remark 1. Note that usually ϕE 6= ϕT , i.e. U-turn point is not the same as turn point, yet inequality ϕT < ϕS1
holds if and only if U-turn point exists. We use turn point ϕT instead of U-turn point ϕE for classification purposes
because U-turn point has no analytic presentation and its numerical calculation requires to solve quite tedious
system of equations. For technical details see Appendix B, subsection Existence of U-turn Point.
The case ϕT > ϕS1 will be considered as “map with regular coastlines”. We consider threshold case ϕT = ϕS1
as regular one for reasons to be explained in Policy Implications.
Pattern 3
µ = 0.25, ρ = 0.75, θ = 0.560885, ϕT ≈ ϕS1 µ = 0.25, ρ = 0.75, θ = 0.7, ϕT > ϕS1
Figure 14: Patterns for “regular coastlines” ϕT > ϕS1
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As for classification of “axes” (see Proposition 7-iii, case of θ > ρ+µ
2(1−µ)ρ ⇐⇒ µ 6
(2θ −1)ρ
1+2θρ
) or in new
“geographic” interpretation, class of “maps with one coastline” there is no need to divide it into subclasses. Direct
calculation show that inequality µ 6 (2θ −1)ρ
1+2θρ
implies that
ϕT =
√
(1−θ)(θρ− (1+θρ)µ)
θ((1−θ)ρ+(1+θρ)µ) > ϕ
∗∗ =
√
(1−θ)(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
(1− (1−θ)(1−µ))(ρ+µ) > ϕ
S
1 .
It means that the single (former northern) coastline always is regular.
Pattern 4
Figure 15: Pattern for “single regular coastline” µ = 0.15, ρ = 0.75, θ = 0.75, ϕS0 = 1
Let’s call for short patterns from Figures 12-15 as follows: Pattern 0 for very special Black Hole case, Pattern
1 and Pattern 2 (hooked ones) are represented in Figure 13, Pattern 3 covers both cases in Figure 14 (there is no
need to separate an intermediate case ϕT = ϕS1 ), and the Pattern 4 is the last one from Figure 15.
The following statement is not quite “strictly mathematical”, because it uses the fuzzy notion of “the same
pattern”, though it is obvious what is meant.
Proposition 9. i) Let Black Hole condition µ > ρ holds. Then for all values of asymmetry measure α = 2θ − 1
the same Pattern 0 is obtained.
ii) Let No-Black-Hole condition µ < ρ and µ > ρ
1+ρ
hold, then for sufficiently small values of α Pattern 1
comes out, while for larger ones it transforms into Pattern 2.
iii) Let No-Black-Hole condition µ < ρ and
ρ
1+2ρ
< µ <
ρ
1+ρ
hold, then increasing α from 0 to 1 changes
the pattern gradually from Pattern 1 through Pattern 2 to Pattern 3.
iv) Finally, let No-Black-Hole condition µ < ρ and µ > ρ
1+2ρ
hold, then increasing α from 0 to 1 changes
the pattern gradually from Pattern 1 through Patterns 2 and 3 to Pattern 4.
This Proposition follows from “comparative statics” of threshold values ϕS0 , ϕ
S
1 , ϕ
B and ϕT with respect to α
(see Lemmas 13, 15, 16 in Appendix B).
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5 Summary
In present paper, a complete study of Krugman’s CP model with agricultural labor asymmetry is carried out. State-
ments are proved which generalize the known results of Mossay (2006) on existence and uniqueness of short run
equilibrium for asymmetric CP model, as well as the results of Robert-Nicoud (2005) on number and stability
of long run equilibria. The comparative statics of equilibrium wages, price indices and welfare (nominal and
relative) with respect to agricultural and industrial labor allocations were studied. All typical patterns of agglomer-
ation, generalizing the well-known “tomahawk diagram” for symmetric CP model, were found and studied. From
substantive point of view it was shown that the statement of Berliant and Kung (2009) on non-robustness of con-
clusions and policy implications based on symmetric CP model is not quite true: for sufficiently small degree of
asymmetry all substantial qualitative conclusions stay true. Only under sufficiently large asymmetry considerable
changes do occur.
All possible cases of comparative statics, number and stability of long-run equilibria may be classified in terms
of relations among series of critical or threshold values: sustain points, break point, U-turn point, etc. Analytical
results of presented paper allow to calculate these values for particular model parameters (i.e. trade costs, labor
shares, consumption characteristics). Comparing the values of these critical points one can identify actual Pattern
of the economy and predict, in some extent, some implications of varius policy options.
Policy Implications
One can consider the following types of economic policy, i.e. purposeful influence of government upon economy,
which is described by CP model: “trade policy” — changing (for example, increasing) of trade freeness, measured
by ϕ , “industral labor policy” — changing (for example, increasing) of industral labor supply, measured by λ , and
“agricultural labor policy” — changing of agricultural population share θ . The first two policies are conducted
in the range of fixed Pattern, while the last one may change initial Pattern, as shown in Proposition 9. However,
conducting of “agricultural policy”, i.e. resettlement of immobile population is very hard task. So we focus
ourselves on discussion of first two policies.
Trade policy
What is the substantial difference between the regular and hooked patterns? Suppose that we start slowly moving
from autarky ϕ = 0 toward full trade liberalization ϕ = 1 being in stable long run equilibrium state. In regular case
we shall move along “northern” coastline until meeting sustain point ϕS1 and then staying in stable agglomerated
equilibrium λ = 1. There is no abrupt junctions on our way. In contrast to this, on the hooked coastline in the most
eastern point we face the “catastrophe” — sharp leap from interior equilibrium to the agglomerated one.
In other words, under sufficiently large asymmetry tariff decreasing unambiguously leads to agglomeration in
big country, leaving no chance to the small one. An the only way for government to change situation is to increase
local demand, which may be considered as substitution for local immobile population. One can say that asymmetry
is more favorable for bigger country. On the other hand, under moderate asymmetry trade policy allows for smaller
country to obtain the favorable conditions for efficient application of industral labor policy.
Industrial labor policy
Suppose that government’s purpose is to become an industrial Core. The taken measures and their result depend
on economy Pattern and starting point.
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It is obvious that in case of Pattern 4 any policy is ineffective — for any given ϕ there is unique long run
equilibrium. The same holds for Pattern 3 in the case sufficiently small trade freeness, more exactly, ϕ 6 ϕS0 . For
larger freeness there are two stable long run equilibria — the agglomerated ones, and “historical choice” of one of
them is path dependent.
Pattern 2 is more sophisticated. We have well-known path dependency for sufficiently large trade freeness
ϕ > ϕS0 , and full determinacy for all ϕ 6 ϕS1 and ϕU 6 ϕ 6 ϕS0 where any industrial labor policy is useless. As for
values ϕS1 < ϕ < ϕ
U result depends on agricultural asymmetry. The bigger country (Home in our case) could reach
the industrial Core position using relatively small policy energies (especially if ϕ is sufficiently close to U-turn
point ϕU ), while any policy of smaller (i.e. Foreign) country is ineffective.
Finally, for Pattern 1 all conclusions of symmetric CP model still hold. The only inessential difference is
that sustain points for each country may be different ϕS0 6= ϕS1 . More exactly, for sufficiently large trade freeness
ϕ > ϕU we obtain full agglomeration with path dependency, for ϕS0 < ϕ 6 ϕU both countries may reach Core
position, though the smaller country needs substantially more political energies. In the case ϕS1 < ϕ 6 ϕS0 only
Home (i.e. larger country) may be efficient, finally, in the case ϕ 6 ϕS1 result is predetermined any policy is
ineffective.
In other words, under sufficiently large asymmetry an industral labor policy turns out inefficient as well as
trade one. As for industral labor policy under moderate asymmetry it is also more favorable to bigger country,
however, if trade barriers are sufficient small, the industral labor policy of smaller country may be effective, but it
may be too expensive. On the other hand, under sufficiently large tariff barriers industral labor policy is inefficient
for both countries. Under intermediate tariff barriers situation is ambiguous but more favorable to bigger country.
Moreover, when the competing countries are almost equal, the ambiguity of direction enables an attempt to
redirect the agglomeration process towards your region. Then two remarks are in place:
(a) in some cases the critical mass of these efforts is needed: small measures do not pay, but big ones do;
(b) in contrast, sometimes propaganda of future development without any real investment is sufficient to deter-
mine the direction and self-fulfilling expectations make the process self-enforcing.
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A Appendix A
A.1 Short Run Equilibrium: Existence and Uniqueness
We get the following two equations (6), (7), connecting nominal wages with exogenous parameters
µ
(
wH ·λ +θ · LaL
λw1−σH +(1−λ )ϕ ·wF 1−σ
+
ϕ
(
wF(1−λ )+(1−θ)LaL
)
λϕwH 1−σ +(1−λ )w1−σF
)
= wσH ,
λwH +(1−λ )wF = µ1−µ ·
La
L
.
Using the second equation we can substitute
1−µ
µ
(λwH +(1−λ )wF) instead of LaL and after simplifying trans-
formations we obtain the following equation:
(1−λ )
[
1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2)−ϕ ·
(
wH
wF
)σ]
−
−λ
[(
1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2)) wHwF −ϕ ·(wHwF )1−σ]= 0 (11)
defining equilibrium relative wage rate wHwF . This equation is analytically insolvable (except the case σ = 2 with
cubic equation).
Denote x =
(
wH
wF
)σ
, A(µ,ϕ,θ) = 1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2), B(µ,ϕ,θ) = 1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2). Note
that 0 < A(µ,ϕ,θ)< 1, 0 < B(µ,ϕ,θ)< 1. Now we can rewrite the previous equation as follows
F(x;µ,ϕ,θ ,λ ) = (1−λ )(A(µ,ϕ,θ)−ϕ · x)−λx1−ρ(B(µ,ϕ,θ)−ϕx−1) = 0. (12)
For fixed values of parameters (µ,ϕ,θ ,λ ) we shall simplify notion of left-hand side to F(x).
Lemma 1. (Existence and uniqueness)
i) Function F(x) decreases with respect to x.
ii) For all admissible values of (µ,ϕ,θ ,λ ) there exists the unique positive root x¯ of equation F(x) = 0 which
belongs to interval (ϕ,ϕ−1).
iii) This root x¯ > 1 if and only if θ > λ + ϕ(1−2λ )(1+ϕ)(1−µ) . Analogously, x¯ < 1 if and only if θ < λ +
ϕ(1−2λ )
(1+ϕ)(1−µ) .
iv) For all admissible values of (µ,ϕ,θ ,λ ) there exists the unique short-run equilibrium.
Proof. Note that
∂F
∂x
=−((1−λ )ϕ+(1−ρ)B(µ,ϕ,θ)λx−ρ +ρ ·λϕx−ρ−1)< 0,
for all admissible values of parameters and x > 0, i.e. F(x) is a strictly decreasing function w.r.t. x > 0. On the
other hand,
F(ϕ) = (1−λ )(1−µ)θ(1−ϕ2)+λϕ1−ρ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2)> 0,
F(ϕ−1) =−(1−λ )((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2)−λϕρ−1(1−µ)(1−θ)(1−ϕ2)< 0
It implies that there exists a unique root x¯ of equation F(x) = 0 which belongs to interval (ϕ,ϕ−1).
This interval always contains the value 1 that distinguishes between cases x¯ < 1 and x¯ > 1. From decreasing of
function F(x) follows that for equilibrium values of wage rates 1 > x¯ ⇐⇒ F(1)< F (x¯) = 0 and F(1)> F (x¯) = 0
analogously. On the other hand,
F(1) = (1−λ )(A(µ,ϕ,θ)−ϕ)−λ (B(µ,ϕ,θ)−ϕ) = (1−ϕ)((1+ϕ)(1−µ)(θ −λ )−ϕ(1−2λ )) .
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It implies that
x¯ < 1 ⇐⇒ θ < λ + ϕ(1−2λ )
(1+ϕ)(1−µ) , x¯ > 1 ⇐⇒ θ > λ +
ϕ(1−2λ )
(1+ϕ)(1−µ) .
The root x¯ defines the equilibrium relative wage as follows wHwF = (x¯)
1/σ . On the other hand, the following
equation
λwH +(1−λ )wF = µ1−µ ·
La
L
allows to obtain the nominal wages as follows:
wF =
µ
1−µ ·
La
L
(
λ wHwF +(1−λ )
) = µ
1−µ ·
La
L
(
λ x¯1/σ +(1−λ )) ,
wH = wF · wHwF =
µ
1−µ ·
La · x¯1/σ
L
(
λ x¯1/σ +(1−λ ))
The rest of equilibrium values, i.e. prices, demand and number of firms, may be explicitly expressed via wages
and model parameters (see (2)-(5)).
A.2 Comparative Statics of Wages
Considering root of equation (12) as implicit function x(θ ,λ ,ϕ,µ,σ)we study its comparative statics, i.e. reaction
on changes in certain parameters. Note that sign of implicit function derivative
sign
∂x
∂ν
= sign
(
−
(
∂F
∂ν
)/(∂F
∂x
))
= sign
∂F
∂ν
(13)
for all ν ∈ {θ ,λ ,ϕ,µ}, because ∂F
∂x
< 0. Besides wHwF = x
1
σ = x1−ρ strictly increase with respect to x, thus
comparative statics of x and relative wage wHwF are equivalent.
Comparative statics with respect to θ
Lemma 2. Relative wage wHwF increases with respect to θ .
Proof. Calculating partial derivative we obtain
∂F
∂θ
= (1−µ)(1−ϕ2)((1−λ )+λx1−ρ)> 0
for all admissible parameter values and x > 0, therefore
∂x
∂θ
> 0 due to (13).
Lemma 3. Nominal wage wH in home region H increases with respect to agricultural labor share θ , while wF
decreases.
Proof. Consider a nominal wage wH as an implicit function of parameters. From equation (7)
λwH +(1−λ )wF = µ1−µ ·
La
L
we obtain
wH = wH(y) =
µ
1−µ ·
La
L ·
(
λ +
(1−λ )
y
)
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where y = wHwF is a relative wage. It is obvious that wH(y) increases with respect to y, i.e.
∂wH
∂y
=
µ
1−µ ·
La
L
· 1−λ
(λy+(1−λ ))2 > 0
and
∂y
∂θ
> 0 (see Lemma 2). Thus
∂wH
∂θ
=
∂wH
∂y
∂y
∂θ
> 0 for all admissible values of parameters.
Comparative statics with respect to λ
We assume (without loss of generality) that home region H posses the greater share of agricultural labor than
foreign F , i.e. θ > 1/2. Consider the following value α = 2θ −1 ∈ [0,1) interpreted as measure of asymmetry in
agricultural population.
Lemma 4. 1. Relative wage wHwF strictly increases with respect to λ if and only if ϕ >
√
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−α2 . Respectively,
wH
wF
strictly decreases with respect to λ if and only if ϕ <
√
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−α2 .
2. Threshold value
√
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−α2 strictly decreases with respect to asymmetry α .
3. If ϕ >
1−µ
1+µ
, relative wage wHwF increases with respect to λ regardless of asymmetry measure.
Proof. Due to (13) it is sufficient to determine sign of
∂F
∂λ
in short run equilibrium x¯. Represent function F(x) as
follows F(x) = (1−λ )F1(x)−λF2(x) where F1(x) = A(µ,ϕ,θ)−ϕx, F2(x) = x1−ρ(B(µ,ϕ,θ)−ϕx−1). Note that
∂F1
∂x
< 0,
∂F2
∂x
> 0 for all x > 0. Let x¯ be a root of equation F(x) = 0, then F2(x¯) =
1−λ
λ
F1(x¯) and consequently
∂F
∂λ
(x¯) =−(F1(x¯)+F2(x¯)) =− 1λ F1(x¯).
It remains to determine the sign of F1(x¯). Define
x∗ =
A(µ,ϕ,θ)
ϕ
, x∗∗ =
ϕ
B(µ,ϕ,θ)
,
which are the positive roots of equations F1(x)= 0 and F2(x)= 0 respectively. Note that x¯∈ [min{x∗,x∗∗} ,max{x∗,x∗∗}]
since F1(x¯) and F2(x¯) should have the same sign. Direct calculations show that
x∗ > x∗∗ ⇐⇒ ϕ <
√
(1−µ)2θ(1−θ)
(1−µ)2θ(1−θ)+µ =
√√√√ 1− (2θ −1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2
− (2θ −1)2
.
Substitute α = 2θ −1 and consider all of possible cases:
ϕ <
√
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−α2 , it implies x∗> x∗∗, thus x¯< x∗ and F1(x¯)>F1(x∗)= 0, because
∂F1
∂x
< 0. In this case
∂F
∂λ
(x¯)< 0.
ϕ >
√
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−α2 , it implies x∗∗> x∗, thus x¯> x∗ and F1(x¯)<F1(x∗)= 0, because
∂F1
∂x
< 0. In this case
∂F
∂λ
(x¯)> 0.
ϕ =
√
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−α2 , it implies x¯ = x∗ = x∗∗ and F1(x¯) = F(x¯) = 0. In this case
∂F
∂λ
(x¯) = 0.
It is obvious that threshold value
√
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−α2 decreases with respect to α , thus it reaches maximum value
1−µ
1+µ
under α = 0 (or θ = 1/2). Consequently, for all ϕ >
1−µ
1+µ
relative wage wHwF increases w.r.t λ .
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A.3 Comparative Statics of Price Indices
Consumer’s Price Index in Home region (see, for example, Combes et al, 2008, 3.1.1.3) are equal to
PH =
(ˆ NH
0
p1−σHH ( j)d j+
ˆ NF
0
p1−σFH ( j)d j
) 1
1−σ
.
Analogously, price index in region F is equal to
PF =
(ˆ NH
0
p1−σHF ( j)d j+
ˆ NF
0
p1−σFF ( j)d j
) 1
1−σ
.
Substituting equilibrium values of prices (4), (5), and numbers of firms NH =
λL
fσ
, NF =
(1−λ )L
fσ
we obtain
PH =
(
NH
(
wHmσ
σ −1
)1−σ
+NF
(
wFmστ
σ −1
)1−σ) 11−σ
=
m ·σ
σ −1
(
L
fσ
) 1
1−σ (
λw1−σH +ϕ · (1−λ )w1−σF
) 1
1−σ ,
PF =
m ·σ
σ −1 ·
(
L
fσ
) 1
1−σ (
λϕw1−σH +(1−λ )w1−σF
) 1
1−σ .
Comparative statics with respect to θ
Lemma 5. Price index PH increases with respect to θ while PF decreases, thereby relative price index
PH
PF
increases
with respect to agricultural population share θ .
Proof. From equation (7)
λwH +(1−λ )wF = µ1−µ ·
La
L
we obtain
wF =
µ
1−µ ·
La
L
(
λ wHwF +(1−λ )
) .
Therefore
PH =
m ·σ
σ −1 ·
(
L
f ·σ
) 1
1−σ
(
wF 1−σ ·
(
λ
(
wH
wF
)1−σ
+(1−λ )ϕ
)) 1
1−σ
=
=
m ·σ
σ −1 ·
(
L
f ·σ
) 1
1−σ µLa
(1−µ)L ·
(λ +(1−λ )(wH
wF
)−1)σ−1
·
(
λ +(1−λ )ϕ
(
wH
wF
)σ−1)
1
1−σ
Recall that σ > 1, therefore PH increases if and only if(
λ +(1−λ )
(
wH
wF
)−1)σ−1
·
(
λ +(1−λ )ϕ
(
wH
wF
)σ−1)
decreases. Equilibrium relative wage wHwF is increasing function with respect to θ (see Lemma 2), thus is is sufficient
to prove that the following function
G(y) =
(
λ +(1−λ )ϕyσ−1)(λ + 1−λ
y
)σ−1
.
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decreases with respect to y. Note that
∂G
∂y
= (1−λ )ϕ(σ −1)yσ−2
(
λ +
1−λ
y
)σ−1
− (σ −1)(λ +(1−λ )ϕyσ−1)(λ + 1−λ
y
)σ−2 1−λ
y2
=
= (1−λ )(σ −1)
(
λ +
1−λ
y
)σ−2(
ϕyσ−2
(
λ +
1−λ
y
)
− (λ +(1−λ )ϕy
σ−1)
y2
)
=
=
λ (1−λ )(σ −1)
y2
(
λ +
1−λ
y
)σ−2
(ϕyσ −1)< 0
if yσ < ϕ−1. On the other hand, for equilibrium relative wage yσ =
(
wH
wF
)σ
∈ (ϕ,ϕ−1) (see Lemma 1-ii). Finally
∂
∂θ
G(y(θ)) =
∂G
∂y
· ∂y
∂θ
> 0,
i.e. price index always increases with respect to θ . Analogously price index in foreign region
PF =
m ·σ
σ −1 ·
(
L
f ·σ
) 1
1−σ (
λϕw1−σH +(1−λ )w1−σF
) 1
1−σ
increases with respect to its share of agricultural labor 1−θ and therefore decreases with respect to θ . Increasing
of relative price index
PH
PF
is a trivial consequence of these two statements.
Comparative statics with respect to λ
Lemma 6. Relative price index
PH
PF
decreases with respect to industrial labor share λ .
Proof. Consider relative price index
PH
PF
(λ ) as a function of industrial labor share λ . Note that
PH
PF
(λ ) =
(
λw1−σH (λ )+(1−λ )ϕwF 1−σ (λ )
λϕw1−σH (λ )+(1−λ )wF 1−σ (λ )
) 1
1−σ
which is equivalent to (
PH
PF
(λ )
)σ−1
=
λ ·ϕ+(1−λ )
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)σ−1
λ +(1−λ )ϕ
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)σ−1 .
Moreover, x =
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)σ
is a root of equation
(1−λ )(A−ϕ · x)−λx1−ρ(B−ϕx−1) = 0
where A = 1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2), B = 1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2).
Consider the special case A ·B = ϕ2, then the root x = A
ϕ
=
ϕ
B
and
(
PH
PF
(λ )
)σ−1
=
λ ·ϕ+(1−λ )
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
λ +(1−λ )ϕ
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
=
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
+λ ·
(
ϕ−
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
)
ϕ
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
+λ ·
(
1−ϕ
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
) .
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Note that
∂
∂λ

(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
+λ ·
(
ϕ−
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
)
ϕ
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
+λ ·
(
1−ϕ
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
)
=−
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ (
1−ϕ2)(
ϕ
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
+λ ·
(
1−ϕ
(
A
ϕ
) σ−1
σ
))2 < 0,
i.e. in this case
(
PH
PF
(λ )
)σ−1
strictly decreases as well as PHPF (λ ).
Let A ·B 6= ϕ2 then from equation (8) we obtain
λ
(1−λ ) =
A−ϕx
x1−ρ(B−ϕx−1) =
xρ(A−ϕx)
Bx−ϕ ,
thus (
PH
PF
(λ )
)σ−1
=
λ
(1−λ ) ·ϕ+ xρ
λ
(1−λ ) +ϕ · xρ
=
xρ (A−ϕx)
Bx−ϕ ·ϕ+ xρ
xρ (A−ϕx)
Bx−ϕ +ϕ · xρ
=
(A−1) ·ϕ+(B−ϕ2)x
(A−ϕ2)+(B−1) ·ϕ · x = S(x).
Note that relative price index
PH
PF
(λ ) increases if and only if S(x(λ )) increases, moreover,
∂S
∂λ
=
∂S
∂x
· ∂x
∂λ
. The
first multiplicand
∂S
∂x
=
∂
∂x
(
(A−1) ·ϕ+(B−ϕ2)x
(A−ϕ2)+(B−1) ·ϕ · x
)
=
(1−ϕ2) · (AB−ϕ2)
((A−ϕ2)+(B−1) ·ϕ · x)2
,
therefore
∂S
∂x
> 0 if and only if A ·B > ϕ2. On the other hand, it is easily to see that
A ·B > ϕ2 ⇐⇒ ϕ <
√√√√ 1− (2θ −1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2− (2θ −1)2
and ∂x∂λ < 0 (see proof of Lemma 3). The last implication follows from Lemma 4. Analogously,
A ·B < ϕ2 ⇐⇒ ϕ >
√√√√ 1− (2θ −1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2− (2θ −1)2
and ∂x∂λ > 0. It implies that in case A ·B 6= ϕ2 derivative
∂S
∂λ
(x(λ )) =
∂S
∂x
· ∂x
∂λ
< 0, i.e. relative price index
PH
PF
(λ )
decreases for all admissible values of parameters.
Lemma 7. Price indicies PH and PF are equal if and only if the following identity holds
1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ)
1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ) =
(
λ
1−λ
) σ
σ−1
.
Inequality PH > PF holds if and only if
θ >
(1−µ)+µϕ
(1−µ)(1−ϕ) −
(1−µ)+(1+µ)ϕ
(1−µ)(1−ϕ)
(
1+
(
λ
1−λ
) σ
σ−1
)
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or, equivalently,
λ
1−λ <
(
1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ)
1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ)
)ρ
.
Proof. Note that equation
PH
PF
=
(
λw1−σH +(1−λ )ϕwF 1−σ
λϕw1−σH +(1−λ )wF 1−σ
) 1
1−σ
= 1
is equivalent to
(
wH
wF
)σ−1
= λ1−λ . Substituting this term twice into equation (11)
(1−λ )
[
1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2)−ϕ ·
(
wH
wF
)σ−1
·
(
wH
wF
)]
−
−λ
[(
1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2)) wHwF − ϕ(wH
wF
)σ−1
]
= 0,
leaving term wHwF untouched, we obtain the following identity
wH
wF
= 1−λλ · 1−((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ)1−((1−µ)θ+µ)(1−ϕ) . From the other hand,
identity
(
wH
wF
)σ−1
= λ1−λ implies
wH
wF
=
(
λ
1−λ
) 1
σ−1
, therefore
1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ)
1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ) =
(
λ
1−λ
) σ
σ−1
is an necessary and sufficient condition of price indices equalization. Consider this identity as as an equation with
respect to θ . Then its solution is
θ ∗ =
(1−µ)+µϕ
(1−µ)(1−ϕ) −
(1−µ)+(1+µ)ϕ
(1−µ)(1−ϕ)
(
1+
(
λ
1−λ
) σ
σ−1
) .
Relative price index
PH
PF
increases with respect to θ therefore θ > θ ∗ ⇐⇒ PHPF > 1 ⇐⇒ PH > PF and θ < θ ∗ ⇐⇒
PH < PF . Analogously, equalization condition may be considered as equation with respect to λ withe the unique
root λ ∗ satisfying
λ ∗
1−λ ∗ =
(
1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ)
1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ)
)ρ
.
Note that function
λ
1−λ increases with respect to λ , while relative price index
PH
PF
decreases, therefore
PH
PF
(λ )> 1 ⇐⇒ λ < λ ∗ ⇐⇒ λ
1−λ <
λ ∗
1−λ ∗
.
A.4 Comparative Statics of Industrial Welfares
Now consider the welfare (or real wage) of industrial workers in both regions
VH =
wH
PµH
=
(
σ −1
m ·σ
)µ
·
(
L
f ·σ
) µ
σ−1
· wH(
λw1−σH +(1−λ )ϕwF 1−σ
) µ
1−σ
.
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Analogously,
VF =
wF
PµF
=
(
σ −1
m ·σ
)µ
·
(
L
f ·σ
) µ
σ−1
· wF(
λϕw1−σH +(1−λ )wF 1−σ
) µ
1−σ
.
Comparative statics with respect to θ
Lemma 8. Welfare VH(θ) increases with respect to θ , while VF(θ) decreases, thus relative welfare
VH
VF
(θ) in-
creases with respect to θ .
Proof. Representing welfare formula as follows
VH(θ) =
(
σ −1
m ·σ
)µ
·
(
L
f ·σ
) µ
σ−1
·w1−µH (θ)
(
λ +(1−λ )ϕ ·
(
wH
wF
(θ)
)σ−1) µσ−1
and recalling that both relative wage wHwF (θ) and nominal wage wH(θ) increase with respect to θ (see Lemma 2
and Lemma 4), we obtain that welfare VH(θ) increases with θ . Analogously, the foreign welfare
VF(θ) =
(
σ −1
m ·σ
)µ
·
(
L
f ·σ
) µ
σ−1
·w1−µF (θ)
(
λϕ+(1−λ ) ·
(
wH
wF
(θ)
)1−σ) µσ−1
.
decreases with respect to θ . Therefore, relative welfare
VH
VF
(θ) increases with respect to θ .
Comparative statics with respect to λ
The relative welfare considered as function of industrial labor share is equal to
VH
VF
(λ ) =
wH
wF
(λ ) ·
(
λϕw1−σH (λ )+(1−λ )wF 1−σ (λ )
) µ
1−σ(
λw1−σA (λ )+(1−λ )ϕwB1−σ (λ )
) µ
1−σ
=
=
(wH
wF
(λ )
) σ−1
µ
·
λ
(1−λ ) +
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)σ−1
ϕ
λ
(1−λ )ϕ+
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)σ−1

µ
σ−1
.
Recall that x =
(
wH
wF
)σ
is a root of equation
(1−λ )(A−ϕ · x)−λx1−ρ(B−ϕx−1) = 0,
where A = 1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2), B = 1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2), 0 < A < 1, 0 < B < 1.
Suppose that A ·B 6= ϕ2 or ϕ 6=
√√√√√ 1− (2θ −1)2(1+µ
1−µ
)2
− (2θ −1)2
, then
λ
1−λ =
A−ϕx
x1−ρ(B−ϕx−1) =
xρ(A−ϕx)
Bx−ϕ
and
VH
VF
(λ ,ϕ) = (R(x(λ ),ϕ))
µ
σ−1 , (14)
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where x(λ ) is implicit function defined by equation mentioned above and
R(x,ϕ) = x
ρ
µ
xρ (A−ϕx)
Bx−ϕ +ϕx
ρ
xρ (A−ϕx)
Bx−ϕ ϕ+ xρ
= x
ρ
µ
(1−µ)θ − ((1−µ)θ +µ)ϕx
(1−µ)(1−θ)x− ((1−θ)+µθ)ϕ .
Note that µσ−1 > 0 thus sign
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(λ ) = sign
∂
∂λ
R(x(λ ),ϕ) = sign
∂R
∂x
sign
∂x
∂λ
. Let a = (1−µ)(1−θ),
b = ((1−θ)+µθ)ϕ , c = (1−µ)θ , d = ((1−µ)θ +µ)ϕ , then
∂R
∂x
= x
ρ
µ−1 ·
ρ
µ · (ax−b)(c−dx)+(bd−ac)x
(ax−b)2 =
x
ρ
µ−1
(ax−b)2 ·Q(x)
where Q(x) = ρµ · (ax−b)(c−dx)+(bd−ac)x and sign
∂R
∂x
= sign Q(x).
Lemma 9. Let ϕ >
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 then relative welfare function
VH
VF
(λ ,ϕ) increases with respect to industrial
labor share λ .
Proof. Note that
VH
VF
=
wH
wF
(λ )(
PH
PF
(λ )
)µ
By Lemma 4 for all ϕ >
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 relative wage wHwF (λ ) is strictly positive non-decreasing function with
respect to λ , while relative price index strictly decreases with respect to λ due to Lemma 6. Therefore relative
welfare
VH
VF
increases with respect to λ .
Define the following threshold value that will be called “break-point”
ϕB(ρ,µ,θ) =
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√√√√ 1− (2θ −1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2− (2θ −1)2
Lemma 10. i) Let Black-Hole condition ρ 6 µ holds, then relative welfare VH
VF
strictly increases with respect to
industrial labor share λ .
ii) Let No-Black-Hole condition ρ > µ holds and ϕ > ϕB(ρ,µ,θ), then relative welfare
VH
VF
strictly increases
with respect to industrial labor share λ .
iii) Let No-Black-Hole condition ρ > µ holds and ϕ 6 ϕB(ρ,µ,θ), then there are real values
0 < λ1(θ) 6 λ2(θ) coinciding only for ϕ = ϕB(θ) such that relative welfare
VH
VF
(λ ) increases for all λ < λ1(θ)
and λ > λ2(θ) while for all λ1(θ)< λ < λ2(θ) it decreases.
Proof. i) The case ϕ >
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 was considered in Lemma 9. Now assume that
ϕ <
√√√√ 1− (2θ −1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2
− (2θ −1)2
⇐⇒ bd−ac < 0 ⇐⇒ ∂x
∂λ
< 0.
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Then
Q(x) =
ρ
µ
· (ax−b)(c−dx)+(bd−ac)x6 (ax−b)(c−dx)+(bd−ac)x =−(adx2−2bdx+bc)< 0,
due to Black-Hole condition
ρ
µ
6 1 and the fact that discriminant D = 4b2d2−4(ad)(bc) = 4bd(bd−ac)< 0. It
implies that
∂R
∂x
< 0,
∂x
∂λ
< 0, thus
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
> 0.
ii) Let
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 > ϕ >
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 , then bd− ac < 0 and
∂x
∂λ
< 0. Moreover quadratic
form
Q(x) =
ρ
µ
· (ax−b)(c−dx)+(bd−ac)x =−ρ
µ
adx2+(
ρ−µ
µ
ac+
ρ+µ
µ
bd)x− ρ
µ
bc
is strictly negative if and only if its discriminant
D =
abcd
µ2
(
(ρ−µ)2 ac
bd
+(ρ+µ)2
bd
ac
−2(ρ2+µ2)
)
< 0.
It is light to see that this takes place if and only if 1 <
ac
bd
<
(
ρ+µ
ρ−µ
)2
. The first inequality is valid due to
assumption bd−ac < 0 and the second one
ac
bd
=
(1−µ)2θ(1−θ)
ϕ2(µ+(1−µ)2θ(1−θ)) =
1− (2θ −1)2
ϕ2
((
1+µ
1−µ
)2
− (2θ −1)2
) < (ρ+µ
ρ−µ
)2
is equivalent to ϕ >
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 . Also for all
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 < ϕ <
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 the
following inequalities hold:
∂R
∂x
< 0 and
∂x
∂λ
< 0 therefore R(x(λ )) strictly increases with respect to λ as well as
VH
VF
(λ ).
iii) Consider the following quadratic equation
Q(x) =−ρ
µ
adx2+(
ρ−µ
µ
ac+
ρ+µ
µ
bd)x− ρ
µ
bc = 0.
Previous considerations imply that under assumptions ρ > µ and ϕ 6 ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 its discriminant is
non-negative and there exists two real roots ξ2 6 ξ1 of equation Q(x) = 0 coinciding each other only for
ϕ =
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 . Note that Q(x) > 0 for all ξ2 < x < ξ1 while for x < ξ2 or x > ξ1 imply Q(x) < 0.
Moreover by definition signs of Q(x)and derivative
∂R
∂x
coincide.
In considered case ϕ 6 ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 <
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 which implies
∂x
∂λ
< 0 (see Lemma 3).
Therefore inverse function λ (x) (that may be explicitly obtained from equation (8)) decreases with respect to
x. Define λ1 = λ (ξ1), λ2 = λ (ξ2), then λ1 6 λ2 and they are equal iff ϕ =
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 . Moreover,
derivative ∂R∂λ (x(λ ),ϕ) =
∂R
∂x
∂x
∂λ < 0 if and only if λ1 < λ < λ2 and it is positive for λ < λ1 or λ > λ2. Note that
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in the case ϕ =
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 function R(x(λ ),ϕ) is strictly increasing because λ1 = λ2 and interval of
decreasing is empty.
It is not guaranteed that both λ1,λ2 ∈ (0,1) and numerical simulations show that, for example, case 1< λ1 < λ2
is quite possible. Note that, in λ = 0 relative welfare always increases (see Lemma 11 below) which implies either
0 < λ1 or λ2 < 0. However, the second case is impossible because in No-Black-Hole case for sufficiently small
ϕ > 0 we have
VH
VF
(0)> 1 and
VH
VF
(1)< 1 (see Lemma 13 in Appendix B), i.e. relative welfare should somewhere
decrease between λ = 0 and λ = 1.
Let’s define one more threshold value that could be called “turn point”
ϕT (θ) =
√
max
{
0,
(1−θ)(θρ− (1+θρ)µ)
θ((1−θ)ρ+(1+θρ)µ)
}
.
Note that for all µ > θρ
1+θρ
identity ϕT (θ)≡ 0 holds.
Lemma 11. For all 0<ϕ < 1 relative welfare
VH
VF
(λ ,ϕ) increases in λ = 0, i.e.
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(0,ϕ)> 0. Relative welfare
VH
VF
(λ ,ϕ) increases in λ = 1, i.e.
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(1,ϕ) > 0 if and only if ϕ > ϕT (θ), in particular,
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(1,ϕ) > 0 for
all ϕ in the case of µ > θρ
1+θρ
.
Proof. Due to Lemma 9 it is sufficient to consider the case ϕ <
√
1−(2θ−1)2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−(2θ−1)2 only. In this case
∂x
∂λ
< 0 and
VH
VF
(λ ,ϕ) increases if and only if
∂R
∂x
< 0. In turn, x = x(λ ) is a root of equation
(1−λ )(A−ϕ · x)−λx1−ρ(B−ϕx−1) = 0,
where A = 1− ((1−θ)+ µθ)(1−ϕ2), B = 1− ((1− µ)θ + µ)(1−ϕ2). Consider two special cases λ = 0 and
λ = 1, then the corresponding roots are x =
A
ϕ
and x =
ϕ
B
. Recall that
∂R
∂x
< 0 if and only if Q(x)< 0 where
Q(x) =
ρ
µ
· (ax−b)(c−dx)+(bd−ac)x,
a = (1− µ)(1− θ), b = ((1− θ) + µθ)ϕ , c = (1− µ)θ , d = ((1− µ)θ + µ)ϕ . Due to assumption θ > 1/2
we consider an asymmetry measure α = 2θ − 1 ∈ [0,1). Substituting 1+α
2
instead of θ we obtain, after some
transformations, that
Q
(
A
ϕ
)
=
(1−µ)2(1−α2)− ((1+µ)2− (1−µ)2α2)ϕ2
16µϕ
f (α,ρ,µ,ϕ),
where
f (α,ρ,µ,ϕ)=−[(1−µ)(1+α)(2+(1−α)ρ)µ−(1−α)ρ)+((1−α)+(1+α)µ)((1+α)ρ+(2+(1−α)ρ)µϕ2)].
Note that the first multiplicand is positive due to assumption ϕ2 <
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2
−α2
=
(1−α2)(1−µ)2
(1+µ)2− (1−µ)2α2 .
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Moreover,
f (α,ρ,µ,ϕ)<−(1+α)[(1−µ)((2+(1−α)ρ)µ− (1−α)ρ)+((1−α)+(1+α)µ)ρ]
because ϕ2 > 0, thus Q
(
A
ϕ
)
< 0 if and only if
g(α,ρ,µ) = (1−µ)((2+(1−α)ρ)µ− (1−α)ρ)+((1−α)+(1+α)µ)ρ > 0.
Routine calculations show that under assumptions 06 α 6 1, 06 µ 6 1, 06 ρ 6 1 minimum value of polinomial
function g(α,ρ,µ) is equal to 0 and it is reached on the set of points (α,ρ,0) for arbitrary 06 α 6 1,
06 ρ 6 1. Therefore for all admissible values (e.g. µ > 0) the term g(α,ρ,µ) is strictly positive. The case λ = 0
is considered.
Now let λ = 1 and study the sign of Q
(ϕ
B
)
. After some transformations we get
Q
(ϕ
B
)
=
(1−µ)ϕ [(1−µ)2(1−α2)− ((1+µ)2− (1−µ)2α2)ϕ2]
4µ((1−α)(1−µ)+(1+µ+(1−µ)α)ϕ2)2 h(α,ρ,µ,ϕ),
where
h(α,ρ,µ,ϕ) = (1−α)((1+α)(1−µ)ρ−2µ)− (1+α)((1−α)ρ+(2+(1+α)ρ)µ)ϕ2.
Note that the first multiplicand is strictly positive due to assumption
ϕ2 <
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2
−α2
=
(1−α2)(1−µ)2
(1+µ)2− (1−µ)2α2 .
On the other hand, h(α,ρ,µ,ϕ) may positive or negative depending on parameter’s relations. More exactly,
h(α,ρ,µ,ϕ)< 0 if and only if
ϕ2 >
(1−α)((1+α)ρ− (2+(1+α)ρ)µ)
(1+α)((1−α)ρ+(2+(1+α)ρ)µ) .
Reverse substitution α = 2θ −1 transforms this inequality into
ϕ2 >
(1−θ)(θρ− (1+θρ)µ)
θ((1−θ)ρ+(1+θρ)µ) .
Note that under condition µ > θρ
1+θρ
numerator is negative and this inequality holds for all ϕ .
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B Appendix B
B.1 Stability of agglomerated equilibria
Direction of labor migration flow depends on welfare levels in both regions. For example, VH(λ ) > VF(λ ) for
some 0 < λ < 1 causes in-flow, i.e. increasing of λ and vice versa. As for limit cases λ = 0 or λ = 1 we interpret
condition VH(0)<VF(0) (or
VH
VF
(0)< 1) as stable state, because λ = 0 cannot be decreased further, while opposite
inequality characterizes unstable situation. Analogously, λ = 1 is stable if VH(1) > VF(1) ⇐⇒ VHVF (1) > 1.
Note that the same result may be obtained by linearizing of ad-hoc equation λ˙ = λ · (1−λ )(VA(λ )−VB(λ )) in
neighborhoods of steady states λ = 0 and λ = 1.
Recall that by convention the home agricultural labor share satisfies condition θ > 1/2. Consider the following
value α = 2θ −1 ∈ [0,1) that may be interpreted as measure of asymmetry in agricultural labor.
Lemma 12. In the case of µ > ρ (Black-Hole condition) both agglomerated states λ = 0 and λ = 1 are stable
regardless of other parameter values.
Proof. Note that
VH
VF
(λ ) =
wH
wF
(λ ) ·
(
λϕw1−σH (λ )+(1−λ )wF 1−σ (λ )
) µ
1−σ(
λw1−σH (λ )+(1−λ )ϕwF 1−σ (λ )
) µ
1−σ
=
=
(wHwF (λ )
) σ−1
µ
·
(
λ
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)1−σ
+(1−λ )ϕ
)
(
λϕ
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)1−σ
+(1−λ )
)

µ
σ−1
where wHwF (λ ) is a root equation
(1−λ )((1−µ)θ +((1−θ)+µθ)ϕ2)− (1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2))λ · wHwF−
−(1−λ )ϕ ·
(
wH
wF
)σ
+λϕ ·
(
wH
wF
)1−σ
= 0.
This equation allows explicit solution in the cases λ = 0 or λ = 1.
For λ = 0 we obtain that
VH
VF
(0) = lim
λ→0
VH
VF
(λ ) =
(
θ(1−µ)ϕ µ−ρρ +ϕ µ+ρρ (1−θ(1−µ))
) 1
σ
,
where ρ = σ−1σ . Analogously,
VH
VF
(1) =
(
(1−θ)(1−µ)ϕ µ−ρρ +ϕ µ+ρρ (1− (1−θ)(1−µ))
)− 1σ
.
Consider the following functions
G(µ,ρ,ϕ,θ) = θ(1−µ)ϕ µ−ρρ +(1−θ(1−µ))ϕ µ+ρρ ,
H(µ,ρ,ϕ,θ) = (1−θ)(1−µ)ϕ µ−ρρ +(1− (1−θ)(1−µ))ϕ µ+ρρ
then agglomerated equilibrium λ = 0 is stable if and only if G(µ,ρ,ϕ,θ) < 1 and λ = 1 is stable if and only if
H(µ,ρ,ϕ,θ)< 1. Under Black-Hole condition µ > ρ both function G and H increase with respect to ϕ . Moreover
G(µ,ρ,1,θ) = H(µ,ρ,1,θ) = 1 thus G(µ,ρ,ϕ,θ)< 1 and H(µ,ρ,ϕ,θ)< 1 for all 0 < ϕ < 1.
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Lemma 13. Suppose that No-Black-Hole condition µ < ρ holds.
1. Let µ > ρ
1+2ρ
then for all α ∈ [0,1) there exist ϕS0 (α), ϕS1 (α) ∈ (0,1) such that ϕS0 (0) = ϕS1 (0), for all
α ∈ (0,1) are differentiable and ∂ϕ
S
0
∂α
> 0,
∂ϕS1
∂α
< 0, in particular, 0 < ϕS1 (α) < ϕ
S
0 (α) < 1. For any given α
agglomerated equilibrium λ = 0 is stable if and only if ϕ > ϕS0 (α) and λ = 1 is stable if and only if ϕ > ϕ
S
0 (α).
2. Let µ <
ρ
1+2ρ
and α∗ =
(1+ρ)µ
(1−µ)ρ . Then for all α ∈ [0,α
∗) there exist ϕS0 (α), ϕ
S
1 (α) ∈ (0,1) such that
ϕS0 (0) = ϕ
S
1 (0), for all α ∈ (0,1) are differentiable and
∂ϕS0
∂α
> 0,
∂ϕS1
∂α
< 0, in particular, 0< ϕS1 (α)< ϕ
S
0 (α)< 1.
For all α ∈ [α∗,1) values ϕS0 (α) ≡ 1 while ϕS1 (α) < 1. In any case, for any given α agglomerated equilibrium
λ = 0 is stable if and only if ϕ > ϕS0 (α) and λ = 1 is stable if and only if ϕ > ϕ
S
0 (α).
Proof. Note that under No-Black-Hole condition ρ > µ we have lim
ϕ→0
G(µ,ρ,ϕ,θ) = +∞, G(µ,ρ,1,θ) = 1. The
first derivative
∂G
∂ϕ
= θ(1−µ)µ−ρ
ρ
ϕ
µ−2ρ
ρ +
µ+ρ
ρ
(1−θ(1−µ))ϕ µρ
is equal to zero in the single point ϕ∗ =
√
θ(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
(1−θ(1−µ))(ρ+µ) . Moreover, the second derivative
∂ 2G
∂ϕ2
= θ(1−µ)µ−ρ
ρ
· µ−2ρ
ρ
ϕ
µ−3ρ
ρ +
µ+ρ
ρ
· µ
ρ
(1−θ(1−µ))ϕ µ−ρρ > 0,
i.e. G is a convex function with respect to ϕ and ϕ∗ is a minimum point for any fixed θ , µ and ρ > µ . The same
holds for function H(ϕ) except that the minimum point value is equal to ϕ∗∗ =
√
(1−θ)(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
(1−(1−θ)(1−µ))(ρ+µ) .
Recall that we assume θ > 1/2 and consider α = 2θ −1 as a measure of agricultural population’ asymmetry.
Substituting θ =
1+α
2
we obtain the following terms of minimum points ϕ∗, ϕ∗∗ as functions of asymmetry
measure α
ϕ∗(α) =
√
(1+α)(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
((1+µ)− (1−µ)α)(ρ+µ) , ϕ
∗∗ =
√
(1−α)(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
((1+µ)+(1−µ)α)(ρ+µ)
Note that for θ = 1/2 (or α = 0) functions G(µ,ρ,ϕ,1/2) = H(µ,ρ,ϕ,1/2) and consequently ϕ∗∗(0) = ϕ∗(0)
while in case of non-zero asymmetry α = 2θ −1 > 0 (or θ > 1/2) the strict inequality ϕ∗∗(α)< ϕ∗(α) holds.
Note that ϕ∗(α) increases with respect to α thus for all α < 1 following inequalities hold
ϕ∗(α) =
√
(1+α)(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
((1+µ)− (1−µ)α)(ρ+µ) < ϕ
∗(0) =
√
(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
µ(ρ+µ)
.
In the case (1−µ)(ρ−µ)µ(ρ+µ) 6 1 or equivalently µ >
ρ
1+2ρ
value ϕ∗(α) < 1 is a unique minimum point of function
G(µ,ρ,ϕ,
1+α
2
) therefore G(µ,ρ,ϕ∗(α),
1+α
2
)< G(µ,ρ,1,
1+α
2
)≡ 1 while lim
ϕ→0
G(ϕ) =+∞ and function G
strictly decreases with respect to ϕ in interval (0,ϕ∗(α)) consequently there exist the unique point
ϕS0 (α) ∈ (0,ϕ∗(α)) such that G(µ,ρ,ϕS0 (α),
1+α
2
) = 1. Moreover for all 0 < ϕ < ϕS0 (α) inequality
G(µ,ρ,ϕ,
1+α
2
) > 1 holds while ϕS0 (α) < ϕ < 1 implies G(µ,ρ,ϕ,
1+α
2
) < 1. Analogously, there exists the
unique value ϕS1 (α) ∈ (0,ϕ∗∗(α)) such that H(ϕ)< 1 if and only if ϕS1 (α)< ϕ < 1.
Now consider sustain points ϕS0 , ϕ
S
1 as functions of asymmetry measure α = 2θ −1 ∈ [0,1). Note that
ϕS0 (0) = ϕ
S
1 (0) because functions G(µ,ρ,ϕ,
1+α
2
) and H(µ,ρ,ϕ,
1+α
2
) coincide for α = 0. For all α ∈ (0,1)
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and fixed ρ > µ sustain point function ϕS0 (α) is an implicit function defined by equation
G(µ,ρ,ϕ,
1+α
2
) =
α+1
2
(1−µ)ϕ µ−ρρ +(1− α+1
2
(1−µ))ϕ µ+ρρ = 1.
Note that ϕS0 (α) belongs to interval (0,ϕ
∗(α)) where G decreases with respect to ϕ i.e.
∂G
∂ϕ
(ϕS0 (α))< 0. On the
other hand,
∂G
∂α
=
(1−µ)
2
(
ϕ
µ−ρ
ρ −ϕ ρ+µρ
)
=
(1−µ)
2
(
(ϕ
µ−ρ
ρ −1)+(1−ϕ ρ+µρ )
)
> 0
because ϕ ∈ (0,1), µ−ρ
ρ
< 0 ,
µ+ρ
ρ
> 0. It implies that an implicit function derivative
∂ϕS0
∂α
=−∂G
∂α
/∂G
∂ϕ
> 0,
i.e. ϕS0 increases with respect to α . Analogous considerations show that ϕ
S
1 decreases with respect to α .
Now consider the case µ <
ρ
1+2ρ
which is equivalent to
(1+ρ)µ
(1−µ)ρ < 1. Note that inequality
α = 2θ −1 < α∗ = (1+ρ)µ
(1−µ)ρ is equivalent to
(1+α)(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
((1+µ)− (1−µ)α)(ρ+µ) < 1 that implies
ϕ∗(α) =
√
(1+α)(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
((1+µ)− (1−µ)α)(ρ+µ) < 1.
Thus for α < α∗ all of the previous considerations still hold. In case of α > α∗ an inequality
ϕ∗(α) =
√
(1+α)(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
((1+µ)− (1−µ)α)(ρ+µ) > 1 holds. It means that function G(ϕ) > 1 for all ϕ ∈ (0,1) which
implies instability of agglomerated equilibrium λ = 0 for all ϕ ∈ (0,1) , i.e. ϕS0 (α) = 1. For ϕS1 (α) nothing
changes because
ϕ∗∗(α) =
√
(1−α)(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
((1+µ)+(1−µ)α)(ρ+µ) 6 ϕ
∗∗(0) =
√
(1−µ)(ρ−µ)
(1+µ)(ρ+µ)
< 1
for all α > 0.
B.2 Number and Stability of Interior Long Run Equilibria
Note that industrial labor share 0< λ 0 < 1 defines the interior long run equilibrium if and only if VH(λ 0) =VF(λ 0)
or
VH
VF
(λ 0) = 1.
Consider the special case A ·B = ϕ2.Then an equation (11) has a unique positive root x¯ = Aϕ while λ ∈ [0,1]
may be arbitrary (see proof of Lemma 6 in Appendix A). It is easy to see that identity A ·B = ϕ2 is equivalent
to ϕ =
√√√√√ 1−α2(1+µ
1−µ
)2
−α2
, where α = 2θ − 1 a measure of asymmetry in agricultural labor. On the other hand,
equilibrium relative wage
wH
wF
= (x¯)
1
σ . Substituting it into interior long run equilibrium equation
VA
VB
(λ ) =
(wH
wF
(λ )
) σ−1
µ
·
λ +(1−λ )
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)σ−1
ϕ
λϕ+(1−λ )
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)σ−1

µ
σ−1
= 1
we obtain the unique solution
λ 0 =
x¯ρ −ϕ · x¯ ρ(1+µ)µ
x¯ρ −ϕ · x¯ ρ(1+µ)µ + x¯ ρµ −ϕ
.
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Note that condition λ 0 ∈ (0,1) is not guaranteed.
Consider the general case A ·B 6= ϕ2 then the interior long run equilibrium equation
VA
VB
(λ ) =
(wH
wF
(λ )
) σ−1
µ
·
λ +(1−λ )
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)σ−1
ϕ
λϕ+(1−λ )
(
wH
wF
(λ )
)σ−1

µ
σ−1
= 1
is equivalent to R(x(λ )) = 1 where
R(x) = x
ρ
µ
(1−µ)θ − ((1−µ)θ +µ)ϕx
(1−µ)(1−θ)x− ((1−θ)+µθ)ϕ
(see (14)) and for each root x0 of this equation the corresponding value of λ 0 may be found as a single root of
equation
(1−λ )(A−ϕ · x0)−λ (x0)1−ρ (B−ϕ (x0)−1) = 0,
where A= 1−((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2), B= 1−((1−µ)θ+µ)(1−ϕ2). Note that for this value the case λ 6∈ (0,1)
is quite possible, thus not each root of equation R(x) = 1 corresponds to some interior long run equilibrium.
Lemma 14. Let Black-Hole condition µ > ρ holds. Then there exists the unique interior long run equilibrium
and it is unstable.
Proof. Under Black-Hole condition ρ 6 µ relative welfare VAVB (λ ) strictly increases with respect to λ (see Lemma
11-i in Appendix A) and
VH
VF
(0)< 1,
VH
VF
(1)> 1 due to Lemma 12 from Appendix A. It implies that there exists the
unique value λ 0 ∈ (0,1) such that VH(λ 0) =VF(λ 0). Moreover, ∂∂λ
VH
VF
(λ 0)> 0 (as well as for all λ ∈ [0,1]).
No-Black-Hole Case: Stability Patterns for Interior Long Run Equilibria
Black-Hole case was completely described in Lemma 14, thus we further consider Non-Black-Hole case only.
Note that Lemma 10 from Appendix A hold for arbitrary values λ ∈ (0,+∞) of roots of equation R(x(λ )) = 1.
This root defines long run equilibria only if 0 < λ < 1. Anyway, this lemma implies that there exists threshold
value of trade freeness
ϕB(ρ,µ,α) =
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√√√√ 1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2
−α2
∈ (0,1)
dividing admissible values set (ϕ,λ ) ∈ (0,1)× [0,1] into two parts. In rectangle [ϕB,1)× [0,1] relative wel-
fare
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) is continuous function strictly increasing with respect to λ which implies existence of at most
one long run equilibrium for each ϕ ∈ [ϕB,1). On the other hand, in rectangle (0,ϕB)× [0,1] relative wel-
fare
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) is continuous function with dynamics depending on fact if interval (0,1) covers both values of
λ1 < λ2, only one value or none. Anyways, for all admissible values of λ < λ1 relative welfare
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) in-
creases, for λ1 < λ < λ2 it decreases and for λ > λ2 increases again. Note that in symmetric case θ = 12 (or α = 0)
ϕB(ρ,µ,0) =
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1(
1+µ
1−µ
)2 = (ρ−µ)(1−µ)
(ρ+µ)(1+µ)
∈ (0,1) and coincides with symmetric break-point that ends the
“helve of tomahawk” (see Figure 1, left-hand plot).
Lemma 15. Break-point ϕB(α) decreases with respect to α and ϕB(1) = 0. There exists the unique value
α˜ ∈ (0,1) such that ϕB(α˜) = ϕS0 (α˜), ϕB(α) > ϕS0 (α) for α ∈ [0, α˜) and ϕB(α) < ϕS0 (α) for α ∈ (α˜,1]. For all
α ∈ [0,1] inequality ϕB(α)> ϕS1 (α) holds.
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Proof. It is obvious that ϕB(ρ,µ,α) decreases with respect to α and ϕB(ρ,µ,1) = 0. Moreover sustain point
ϕS0 (α) increases with respect to α (see Lemma 9 in Appendix A) and in symmetric case we obtain
ϕB(ρ,µ,0)> ϕS0 (0) = ϕ
S
1 (0) (see, for example, Robert-Nicaud, 2005, Proposition 5). Thus there exists the unique
value α˜ such that ϕB(ρ,µ, α˜) = ϕS0 (α˜) and ϕ
B(ρ,µ,α) > ϕS0 (α) for α ∈ [0, α˜), ϕB(ρ,µ,α) < ϕS0 (α) for α ∈
(α˜,1].
Note that both ϕB(ρ,µ,α) and ϕS0 (α) converge to 0 for α → 1. By definition of sustain point ϕ > ϕS1 (α) if
and only if relative welfare in agglomerated state λ = 1 satisfies inequality
VH
VF
=
(
(1−α)
2
(1−µ)ϕ µ−ρρ +(1− (1−α)
2
(1−µ))ϕ µ+ρρ
)− 1σ
> 1
(see proof of Lemma 13). To accomplish lemma’s proof we need to verify that inequality
h(α)=
(1−α)
2
(1−µ)
ρ−µρ+µ
√√√√ 1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2
−α2

µ−ρ
ρ
+(1− (1−α)
2
(1−µ))
ρ−µρ+µ
√√√√ 1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2
−α2

µ+ρ
ρ
< 1
holds for all α ∈ [0,1) and 0 < µ < ρ < 1. Note that α = 0 satisfies this inequality because ϕB(ρ,µ,0)> ϕS1 (0).
We shall prove that in fact h(α) is decreasing function with respect to α , therefore inequality h(α) < 1 remains
true for all α > 0.
After differentiation and simplifying we obtain that
∂h
∂α
=
2µ
(
ρ−µ
ρ+µ
√
1−α2(
1+µ
1−µ
)2−α2
) µ+ρ
ρ
· f (α,ρ,µ)
(1−α)(1+α)2(1−µ)((1−α)+µ+αµ)(ρ−µ)2ρ
where
f (α,ρ,µ)=−(1−µ)3ρ2α4+2(1−µ)2µρ2α3+(1−µ)ρ(3µ2+(2−ρ)ρ)−2µ3(1+ρ)2α−(1+µ)ρ(1+ρ)(ρ+µ2)
and sign of derivative
∂h
∂α
obviously coincides with sign of f (α,ρ,µ). Routine, yet very tedious, analysis shows
that polynomial function f (α,ρ,µ) reaches its maximum on set S = {(α,ρ,µ)|06 α 6 1, 06 µ 6 ρ 6 1} in the
points (α,0,0) for arbitrary α ∈ [0,1], this maximum value is equal to 0, thus for all admissible values 0 < µ < ρ
function f (α,ρ,µ)< 0.
Consider various stability patterns of agglomerated long run equilibria described in Lemma 13 and match them
the corresponding patterns of interior ones. Recall one more definition of “turn point” ϕT represented as a function
of α = 2θ −1
ϕT (α) =
√
max
{
0,
(1−α)((1+α)ρ− (2+(1+α)ρ)µ)
(1+α)((1−α)ρ+(2+(1+α)ρ)µ)
}
.
Lemma 16. 1. Let ϕ < ϕS1 (α), then both agglomerated equilibria λ = 0 and λ = 1 are unstable, and there
exists the unique stable interior equilibrium.
2. Let ϕ > ϕB(ρ,µ,α) and ϕ < ϕS0 (α), then agglomerated equilibrium λ = 0 is unstable, λ = 1 is stable,
and there are no interior equilibria.
3. Let ϕ > ϕB(ρ,µ,α) and ϕ > ϕS0 (α), then both agglomerated equilibria λ = 0 and λ = 1 are stable,
and there exists the unique unstable interior equilibrium.
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4. Let ϕS1 (α)< ϕ < ϕ
B(ρ,µ,α), ϕT (α)> ϕS1 (α) and ϕ < ϕ
S
0 (α), then agglomerated equilibrium λ = 0
is unstable, λ = 1 is stable and there are no interior equilibria.
5. Let ϕS1 (α) < ϕ < ϕ
B(ρ,µ,α), ϕT (α) > ϕS1 (α) and ϕ > ϕ
S
0 (α), then both agglomerated equilibria
λ = 0 and λ = 1 are stable, and there exists the unique unstable interior equilibrium.
6. Let ϕT (α) < ϕS1 (α) < ϕ < ϕ
B(ρ,µ,α) and ϕ < ϕS0 (α), then agglomerated equilibrium λ = 0 is
unstable, λ = 1 is stable, and
6a. if λ2 ∈ (0,1) and VHVF (λ2)< 1 then there are two interior equilibria, stable and unstable,
6b. if λ2 ∈ (0,1) and VHVF (λ2) = 1 (non-generic case) then there is unique unstable interior equilibrium,
6c. in all other cases there are no interior equilibria.
7. Let ϕT (α)< ϕS1 (α)< ϕ < ϕ
B(ρ,µ,α) and ϕ > ϕS0 (α), then both agglomerated equilibria λ = 0 and
λ = 1 are stable, and
7a. if λ1,λ2 ∈ (0,1) , VHVF (λ1)> 1 and
VH
VF
(λ2)< 1 then there exists three interior equilibria, one stable and
two unstable
7b. if λ1,λ2 ∈ (0,1) , VHVF (λ1) = 1 or
VH
VF
(λ2) = 1 (non-generic cases) there are two interior equilibria,
7c. in all other cases there is unique unstable interior equilibrium.
Proof. For any fixed ϕ,µ,θ ,ρ relative welfare
VH
VF
(λ ) may be considered as one-variable function and its plot is
continuous (even smooth) curve. Interior equilibria are the intersection points of this curve with unit level line
VH
VF
= 1.
Case 1. Condition ϕ < ϕS1 (α) 6 ϕS0 (α) implies that
VH
VF
(0) > 1 (i.e. λ = 0 is unstable),
VH
VF
(1) < 1 (i.e.
λ = 1 is unstable), thus plot of
VH
VF
(λ ) intersects at least once and intersection point λ 0 should belong to decreasing
interval (λ1,λ2) (see Lemma 12 in Appendix A), i.e. λ 0 is stable interior equilibrium. On the other hand, for all
λ > λ2 function
VH
VF
(λ ) strictly increases, therefore there are no other intersection points
VH
VF
(λ ) = 1.
Case 2. Let ϕ > ϕB(ρ,µ,α) and ϕ < ϕS0 (α), it implies that
VH
VF
(0)> 1 (i.e. λ = 0 is unstable) and
VH
VF
(λ )
strictly increases for all λ . Thus
VH
VF
(1)> 1 (i.e. λ = 1 is stable) and there are no intersections
VH
VF
(λ ) = 1.
Case 3. Let ϕ > ϕB(ρ,µ,α) and ϕ > ϕS0 (α), it implies that
VH
VF
(0) < 1 (i.e. λ = 0 is stable) and
VH
VF
(λ )
strictly increases for all λ . Thus there is unique intersection
VH
VF
(λ 0) = 1 and
VH
VF
(1) > 1 (i.e. λ = 1 is stable).
Moreover,
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(λ 0)> 0, i.e. λ 0 is unstable.
Case 4. Let ϕS1 (α) < ϕ < ϕ
B(ρ,µ,α), ϕT (α) > ϕS1 (α) and ϕ < ϕ
S
0 (α), it implies that
VH
VF
(0) > 1 (i.e.
λ = 0 is unstable),
VH
VF
(1)> 1 (i.e. λ = 1 is stable)
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(0)> 0 and
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(1)< 0. The last inequality implies
that λ = 1 belongs to decreasing interval (λ1,λ2) while
VH
VF
(1)> 1. It means that there are no intersection points
VH
VF
(λ ) = 1 for λ ∈ (0,1).
Case 5. Let ϕS1 (α) < ϕ < ϕ
B(ρ,µ,α), ϕT (α) > ϕS1 (α) and ϕ > ϕ
S
0 (α), it implies that
VH
VF
(0) < 1 (i.e.
λ = 0 is stable),
VH
VF
(1) > 1 (i.e. λ = 1 is stable)
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(0) > 0 and
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(1) < 0. The last inequality implies
that λ = 1 belongs to decreasing interval (λ1,λ2) while
VH
VF
(1)> 1. It means that there are no intersection points
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VH
VF
(λ ) = 1 for λ ∈ (λ1,1) and there is unique intersection point VHVF (λ
0) = 1 for λ 0 ∈ (0,λ1) which is unstable
interior equilibrium.
The rest cases are more diversified. Numerical simulations show that all listed sub-cases are possible.
Case 6. Let ϕT (α) < ϕS1 (α) < ϕ < ϕ
B(ρ,µ,α) and ϕ < ϕS0 (α), it implies that
VH
VF
(0) > 1 (i.e. λ = 0 is
unstable),
VH
VF
(1) > 1 (i.e. λ = 1 is stable)
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(0) > 0 and
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(1) > 0. Sub-case 6a provides exactly two
intersection points λ 0 ∈ (λ1,λ2) – stable, and λ 00 ∈ (λ2,1) – unstable interior equilibrium. In sub-case 6b these
two intersection points run into tangent point λ2 which is unstable (more exactly, half-stable) interior equilibrium.
In all other sub-cases (λ2 6∈ (0,1) or VHVF (λ2)> 1) there are no intersection points.
Case 7. Let ϕT (α) < ϕS1 (α) < ϕ < ϕ
B(ρ,µ,α) and ϕ > ϕS0 (α), it implies that
VH
VF
(0) < 1 (i.e. λ = 0 is
stable),
VH
VF
(1)> 1 (i.e. λ = 1 is stable)
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(0)> 0 and
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(1)> 0. Conditions
VH
VF
(0)< 1 and
VH
VF
(1)> 1
provide at least one intersection point for all sub-cases. The rest depends on particular sub-case.
B.3 Existence of U-turn point
Sub-cases 6a and 7a of Lemma 16 define the most sophisticated structure of long run equilibria. Using “geo-
graphic” terminology, introduced in subsection 4.2, one can say that in this cases for any given ϕ0 there exist
two interior long run equilibria reside “on northern coastline”. Sub-case 7a provides an additional third interior
equilibrium “on southern coastline” that is always unstable. As for two ’northern’ equilibria, the lesser value λ 0 is
stable, i.e.
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(λ 0)< 0, and the greater one λ 00 is unstable, i.e.
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(λ 00)> 0 (see proof of Case 6, Lemma
16). On the other hand, both points (ϕ0,λ 0) and (ϕ0,λ 00) reside on the same unit equiscalar line
VH
VF
= 1 and gra-
dients ∇0 = grad
VH
VF
(ϕ0,λ 0), ∇00 = grad
VH
VF
(ϕ0,λ 00) of relative welfare function
VH
VF
(ϕ,λ ) applied to these points
directed ’south-eastwards’ and ’north-eastwards’ respectively. Note that this “hook” is possible only if gradient in
sustain point ϕS1 also directed ’north-eastwards’, i.e.
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(ϕS1 ,1)> 0 or, by definition, ϕ
T < ϕS1 (see Figure 16).
Figure 16: U-turn point vs regular case
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U-turn point ϕU is a supremum value for all ϕ with two ’northern’ equilibria 0 < λ 0 < λ 00 < 1. It may
be characterized as multiple ’northern’ interior equilibrium (λ 0 = λ 00 = λU) with “horizontal” gradient, i.e.
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(ϕU ,λU) = 0.
Combining all previous conditions we obtain the following system of equations, that allow to calculate U-turn
point ϕU for given admissible values of parameters θ ,µ,ρ .
1. Short run equilibrium equation of three variables
F1(x,ϕ,λ ) = (1−λ )(A−ϕ · x)−λx1−ρ(B−ϕx−1) = 0,
where x =
(
wH
wF
)σ
, A = 1− ((1−θ)+µθ)(1−ϕ2), B = 1− ((1−µ)θ +µ)(1−ϕ2).
2. Interior long run equilibrium condition VH(ϕ,λ ) =VF(ϕ,λ ), or equivalently,
F2(x,ϕ,λ ) = x
ρ
µ · λ +(1−λ )x
ρϕ
λϕ+(1−λ )xρ −1 = 0.
3. U-turn condition
∂
∂λ
VH
VF
(ϕU ,λU)= 0 that is equivalent (see proof of Lemma 10 in Appendix A) to the following
equation
F3(x,ϕ,λ ) =
ρ
µ
· (ax−b)(c−dx)+(bd−ac)x = 0,
where a = (1−µ)(1−θ), b = ((1−θ)+µθ)ϕ , c = (1−µ)θ , d = ((1−µ)θ +µ)ϕ .
Solution (x,U ϕU ,λU) of this system (if exists) defines U-turn point in case of its admissibility, i.e. 0< ϕU < 1,
0 < λU < 1. There is no need, however, to solve this system for classification purposes only, because existence of
U-turn point may be revealed by analytical verification of more simple inequality ϕT < ϕS1 .
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